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THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005:
THE STORY BEHIND THE STATUTE*
Nan S. Ellis**
Class actions were created to "enable those with small claims for whom
individual litigation would be economically irrational to band together in
group litigation against a common adversary."1  On the other hand,
conventional wisdom is that class actions are "Frankenstein monsters" 2 whose
very existence allows plaintiffs to engage in judicial blackmail inducing
defendants to settle frivolous claims. Thus, we have two views of class actions.
On the one hand, they are essential to protect certain public rights. They allow
lawsuits to be consolidated to preserve court time and plaintiff expense. They
allow lawsuits to be brought to right a wrong where the interest of no single
plaintiff would justify initiation of a lawsuit. On the other hand, they allow
lawsuits to be brought when the interest of no single plaintiff would justify a
lawsuit. Thus, they contribute to the skyrocketing number of lawsuits filed.
Given the small amount that each individual plaintiff has at stake in the
lawsuit, no one benefits but the lawyers who bring the lawsuits. They are
viewed as nothing more than "money generators" for lawyers. 3  Two
competing views of class action lawsuits form the debate around class action
abuses. In many ways, policy debates are conflicts about which alternative
view of a problem correctly defines the condition.4
* "The most erroneous stories are those that we think we know best-and therefore neither
scrutinize nor question." Stephen Jay Gould.
** Professor of Law and Social Responsibility, Loyola College in Maryland.
1. Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary
View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1487 (2008). Class actions "permit the fair and efficient resolution of
legitimate claims of numerous parties by allowing the claims to be aggregated into a single action
against a defendant that has allegedly caused harm." Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-2, 119 Stat. 4 [hereinafter CAFA] (codified in sections of 28 U.S.C.). Class actions have actually
been credited with an "undeniably noble goal of achieving the greatest good for the largest number
of people." Anna Andreeva, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Eight-Year Saga is Finally Over, 59
U. MIAMI L. REV. 385, 385 (2005). A class action is "a lawsuit brought by one person or group on
behalf of many persons who have been, arguably, similarly injured." WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL
MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 38 n.2 (2004).
Moreover, "questions of law or fact common to the members of the class [must] predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members...." See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
2. Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and the "Class
Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 664 (1979).
3. John H. Beisner, Matthew Shores & Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action "Cops": Public
Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (2005).
4. David J. Houston & Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr., The Politics of Air Bag Safety: A Competition
Among Problem Definitions, 28 POL'Y STUD. J. 485 (2000) (citation omitted). "Political debates on
policy issues are often portrayed as a conflict over competing definitions of a social condition."
DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING 309 (1997). Deborah
Stone argues that getting an issue onto the public policy agenda is "a struggle to control which
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Public policy literature tells us that how a public policy problem is defined
is an important component of policy formulation. To begin with, many argue
that what separates a problem from a condition is the fact that problems are
amenable to human intervention. 5 In other words, a dire condition can be
accepted if there are no viable alternatives to ameliorating the condition. Only
when feasible solutions are identified does the condition become a public policy
problem.
Problem definition affects whether the problem makes it to the public
policy agenda, 6 it affects the solutions proposed and it affects the likelihood of
any policy action being endorsed and implemented. 7 Recognition that public
issues are malleable, or open to competing interpretations as well as factual
distortion, 8 is not new. It is generally accepted that "mismatches often exist
between measures of the seriousness of a problem and the level of attention
devoted to it."9 For example, although the data reveal that punitive damages
are rarely awarded, 10 questions surrounding punitive damage awards have
received considerable attention both from the courts and from legislatures. 11
images of the world govern policy."
5. Deborah A. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 POL. ScI. Q. 281
(1989). Deborah Stone asserts that "[tlhere is an old saw in political science that difficult conditions
become problems only when people come to see them as amenable to human action."
6. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Punitive Damages, Change, and the Politics of Ideas: Defining
Public Policy Problems, 1998 WIs. L. REV. 71, 73 (1998). The public policy agenda is the list of issues
that receive serious attention from policymakers. It includes "issues about which it is believed that
governmental action is appropriate and needed."
7. David A. Rochefort & Robert W. Cobb, Problem Definition: An Emerging Perspective, in THE
POLITICS OF PROBLEM DEFINITION: SHAPING THE POLICY AGENDA 15 (David A. Rochefort & Robert
W. Cobb, 1994). "As political discourse, the function of problem definition is at once to explain, to
describe, to recommend, and above all, to persuade." Daniels & Martin, supra note 6, at 74. It is
important to define an issue as a "problem worthy of concern and requiring immediate attention."
8. David A. Rochefort & Robert W. Cobb, Problem Definition, Agenda Access, and Policy Choice,
21 POL'Y STUD. J. 56, 56 (1993). For articles considering the role in problem definition, see generally
David Dery, Agenda Setting and Problem Definition, 21 POL'Y STUD. J. 37 (2000) (discussing problem
definition of the tents movement in Israel); Lauren Eber, Waiting for Watergate: The Long Road to FEC
Reform, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2006) (applying Kingdon's view of agenda setting to FEC reform);
Vanessa Northington Gamble & Deborah Stone, U.S. Policy on Health Inequities: The Interplay of
Politics and Research, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 93 (2006) (using two research reports to compare
problem definition on racial disparities in health); Houston & Richardson, Jr., supra note 4
(discussing how problem definition led to legislation on air bag safety); W.D. Kay, Problem
Definitions and Policy Contradictions: John F. Kennedy and the "Space Race," 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 53 (2003)
(showing how the disagreement over U.S. space policy was explained by problem definition);
Denise Scheberle, Radon and Asbestos: A Study of Agenda Setting and Causal Stories, 22 POL'Y STUD. J.
74 (1994) (using causal stories to explain legislative action against radon and asbestos); Patrick
Impero Wilson, Deficit Reduction as Causal Story: Strategic Politics and Welfare State Retrenchment, 37
Soc. SCI. J. 97 (2000) (discussing how a causal story was used to affect welfare retrenchment
initiatives).
9. Rochefort & Cobb, supra note 8, at 56. See ROBERT L. LINEBERRY, GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA
301-304 (1981). As early as 1981, Lineberry concluded that the intensity of leader advocacy, the
leaders' openness to the issue and the saliency of competing problems affected the level of attention
devoted to an issue.
10. Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes
with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 45 (1992). See generally THOMAS KOENIG & MICHAEL RUSTAD,
IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (2003). But see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REID HAsTE, JOHN W. PAYNE, DAVID A.
SCHKADE & W. KIP VISCUSI, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 1 (2002), where the authors
assert that there has been a rise in the incidence and magnitude of punitive damages.
11. Daniels & Martin, supra note 6, at 76 (quoting ROGER W. COBB & CHARLES D. ELDER,
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE DYNAMICS OF AGENDA-BUILDING 172-73 (1983)).
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Agenda-setting involves a "struggle to control which images of the world
govern policy." 12 It is well recognized in the public policy literature that one
effective way to control the image accepted is through the use of causal
stories. 13
The purpose of this paper is to consider the extent to which problem
definition impacted enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).
Termed a "monumental legislative victory for corporate defendants," 14 CAFA
provides an illustration of how the solution adopted was affected by the story
used to define the problem. In this article, I will retell the causal story to
illustrate both the way in which the problem was defined and the solution that
was adopted. In Part I, I will discuss the public policy literature on problem
definition. In Part II, I will discuss how the problem was defined in a way that
led to enactment of CAFA. This part will discuss how the story that has been
accepted has led to tort reform in general and to enactment of CAFA
specifically. 15 In Part III, I will provide a brief overview of CAFA and link the
specific provisions of CAFA to the rhetoric discussed in Part II. In Part IV, I
Professors Daniels and Martin assert that: •
The claims made about punitive damages are part of a political effort by interest groups
to shape the image of civil justice that will govern public policy. Because policy problems
"arise not so much from events and circumstances as from the means that people attribute
to those events and circumstances,' consistency with the best available empirical evidence
is not necessary for success. Instead of reliable evidence and reasoned argument, the
image is shaped through appeals to emotion and fear.
Id.
12. Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem,
Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 451 (2004). A content analysis of a widely cited pro-reform
book reveals that the "evidence" offered to support the factual assertions made includes 272
anecdotes, 1 case study and 6 citations to statistical studies. Rhode recounts a number of cases
where the "skewed spin" differs from the facts and concludes that "facts fall by the wayside to
make a better story, and the public misses what the real story should be... Stories are easier to sell
than statistics, so descriptions of what the ATRA [American Tort Reform Association] terms
'lawsuit abuse' are frequently long on folklore and short on facts." Id. at 455-456. See also HALTOM &
MCCANN, supra note 1, 7-10 (discussing the realist response to misstatements about tort reform).
According to Haltom and McCann, the realist uses statistics to demonstrate that the "tort reform
campaign has been built on 'baseless fictions' and unrepresentative stories." Id. at 7. They cite as
examples evidence that plaintiffs rarely win large judgments in products liability actions and
evidence that the volume of products liability and medical malpractice suits have not increased in
recent decades. Id. Haltom and McCann offer a number of reasons for why the realist approach is
not very effective, including the fact that the results of their research are typically published in
scientific and legal journals that are not widely read. Id. See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg,
Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social Science: Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L.
REV. 1097, 1101 (2008) (summarizing the results of studies discounting the "rhetoric of crisis"). She
notes the inaccuracy of the rhetoric, noting that oftentimes the stories are "merely fabricated and
then repeated until they seem to be factual." Id. at 1102.
13. The importance of the narrative has also been recognized in legal commentary. See, e.g.,
Benjamin Baez, The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action: Narratives about Race and Justice, 18 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 413 (1999).
14. William C. Roedder, An Introduction to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 56 FDCC Q. 443,
463 (2006). CAFA has also been characterized as one of the "trio of 'tort reform' measures" sought
by the Bush Administration that have been coupled with "unrelenting attacks on lawyers in general
and plaintiffs' lawyers in particular..." Burbank, supra note 1, at 1441.
15. Recognition of the role of problem definition in tort reform is not new. See, e.g., Daniels &
Martin, supra note 6; Rhode, supra note 12, at 447. Daniels and Martin consider the empirical
question posed by Michael Rustad, "[W]hy the accepted wisdom of a punitive damages explosion
persists when there is no empirical data supporting it." Rustad, supra note 10, at 45 (1992). Daniels
and Martin offer problem definition as their answer to this question.
[Vol. 35:2
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will conclude by showing that the public policy justifications for CAFA are
questionable. This part will rely on empirical data and argue that alternative
causal stories were every bit as plausible but were rejected. This part will
consider the fact that there are two views of class actions -hero and villain.
I. PART I: PROBLEM DEFINITION
Q: What's wrong with lawyer jokes?
A: Lawyers don't think they're funny and other people don't think they're jokes.16
We all know the stories. A person is injured. The best stories are when he
is injured because of his own carelessness. Examples of this abound. He is
using his lawnmower as hedge clippers,17 she spills hot coffee in her lap,18 or
he becomes a milk-a-holic and suffers a stroke. 19 Then, instead of accepting
responsibility for his/ her own actions, he becomes a plaintiff. He seeks to shift
responsibility for his actions onto a hapless defendant. It is like winning the
lottery. Sometimes the plaintiff is seeking damages for absurd injuries. She is
asking to be compensated because a CAT scan destroyed her psychic powers. 20
Luckily, he is able to enlist the help of the most likely of all villains - a greedy
attorney, and they are all greedy. An attorney is willing to take his case
without payment. He will only accept payment if he wins the case, but then he
will ask for an excessive amount. This story has two villains-the greedy
plaintiff and the greedy lawyer. It has two victims-the hapless defendant 2'
and the plaintiff who is forced to pay his co-conspirator an unfair portion of the
lottery award. Most importantly, the story tells us, we all suffer. We are forced
to pay higher prices, we cannot find doctors when we need them and American
competitiveness abroad suffers.
We all know the stories. They form the basis for countless "lawyer jokes." 22
16. The Truth about Lawyers, http://www.swapmeetdave.com/Humor/Lawyer.htm (last
visited Mar. 23, 2009).
17. See Rustad, supra note 10; Daniels & Martin, supra note 6. This story is not actually based on
a real case. A causal story does not need to be based in fact to be effective. Fiction is often stranger,
and more persuasive, than fact.
18. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S. Inc., No. D-202 CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309
(Bernalilo County, N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994).
19. HALTOM & MCCANN supra note 1, at 64. Haltom and McCann provide a number of
examples of tort tales, including a man who sued Sears because he pulled so hard trying to start his
lawnmower that he had a heart attack. See id. at 67. See also Rhode, supra note 12, at 448-449
(providing examples of what she terms "loony litigation").
20. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 1-2. Haltom and McCann call this a "widely
circulated narrative." What the story fails to reveal is that the case was dismissed without any
judgment.
21. The story totally ignores the fact that the hapless defendant is often a million dollar
corporation with its own legal team. It also ignores the fact that more times than not the plaintiff is
also a million dollar corporation. See Rhode, supra note 12, at 457 (discussing the fact that "disputes
between businesses are the largest and fastest growing category of civil cases"). See also John T.
Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 1021, 1080-1081 (2005) ("One of the unheralded developments in civil litigation during
the last thirty years has been a dramatic increase in business-against-business tort litigation.").
22. See generally MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES & LEGAL CULTURE (2005).




As such, they appear to harmless fun. However, these "tort tales," 23 provide a
causal story that fuels claims for tort reform. They define the problem and
attach solutions to the problem. As such, they have been critical in the tort
reform movement.
Public policy formulation is often viewed as a chronological or linear
process. Problems are identified, solutions are proposed, the best alternative is
selected, policy is formulated and then implemented. The so-called "rationality
perspective" 24 assumes a rational process of decision-making leading to policy
formulation. 25 Some political scientists, however, question the linear process of
the policy formation process, most notably, Professor John Kingdon. Kingdon
sees problems as floating in a "primeval soup," waiting to encounter policies
suited to these problems and the ideal political environment. 26  While less
linear than the rational perspective, this view of the policy formation process
sees solutions as being coupled with clearly defined problems. Others argue
that oftentimes the solution begets the problem. In other words, issues are
identified, and recognized as problems, only when they are attached to clearly
defined solutions. 27 Under this approach, problems are purposefully defined
in ways as to point to already supported solutions.
All agree that how the problem is defined determines the likelihood of it
ending up on the public policy agenda and the likelihood of any eventual
public policy formulation. Moreover, the way in which a problem is defined 28
23. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 5-6.
24. Rochefort & Cobb, supra note 8, at 56.
25. The rational model of decision-making assumes that policy-makers "first define their goals
rather clearly and set the levels of achievement of those goals that would satisfy them. Then, they
would canvass many (ideally, all) alternatives that might achieve these goals. They would compare
the alternatives systematically, assessing their costs and benefits, and then would choose the
alternatives that would achieve their goals at the least cost." See generally JOHN W. KINGDON,
AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 78 (1995) (explaining this model and then
concluding, "such a model does not very accurately describe reality."
26. Id. at 116-117. Kingdon based his work on the "garbage can" model of decision making
promoted by Cohen, March and Olsen. See generally Michael Cohen, James March & Johan Olsen, A
Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1972). Under Kingdon's view, there
are three separate "streams" relevant to agenda setting: problems, policies and politics. Specifically,
"[pleople recognize problems, they generate proposals for public policy changes, and they engage
in such political activities as election campaigns and pressure group lobbying," KINGDON, supra
note 25, at 87. He sees these streams as operating separately, but hypothesizes that they come
together, or "couple" during "policy windows of opportunity."
27. AARON WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER 42 (1979). See Stone, supra note 6, at 298
("Like the famous six characters in search of an author, people with pet solutions often march
around looking for problems that need their solutions.").
28. BRIAN W. HOGWOOD & LEWIS A. GUNN, POLICY ANALYSIS FOR THE REAL WORLD 108 (1984).
Problem definition has been defined as "the processes by which an issue (problem, opportunity, or
trend), having been recognized as such and placed on the public policy agenda, is perceived by
various interested parties; further explored, articulated, and possibly quantified; and in some but
not all cases, given an authoritative or at least provisionally acceptable definition in terms of its
likely causes, components, and consequences." Julie Davies, Reforming the Tort Reform Agenda, 25
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 119, 147-58 (2007). Problem definition "provides the frame through which
current conditions are perceived to be in conflict with treasured social values." Houston &
Richardson, supra note 5, at 485. For example, Professor Davies argues that integrating
consideration of the problem of the uninsured onto the agenda for tort reform might be a way to
"gain political traction" and move the health care issue onto the public policy agenda successfully.
[Vol. 35:2
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is affected by the rhetoric used to discuss the issue. 29 Professor Stone sees
problem definition as a "process of image making" 30 and highlights the
importance of the narrative in making that image one that is amenable to
placement on the public policy agenda. Most importantly for the purposes of
this article, she asserts that:
Conditions, difficulties, or issues thus do not have inherent properties that
make them more or less likely to be seen as problems or to be expanded.
Rather, political actors deliberately portray them in ways calculated to gain
support for their side. They compose stories that describe harms and
difficulties, attribute them to actions of other individuals or organizations,
and thereby claim the right to invoke governmental power to stop the
harm. 31
In her now classic work on causal stories, Professor Stone argues that political
actors use "narrative story lines and symbolic devices to manipulate so-called
issue characteristics, all the while making it seem as though they are simply
describing facts." 32
A story can be constructed in a way that will move the perceived problem
onto the public policy agenda and in a way that will make action more likely.
33
What characteristics of the story are important? First, the story must be
contrived in a way that attributes blame or culpability in an explanation of the
causes of the problem. If the story is constructed in a way in which the problem
is perceived to be caused by purposeful action, as distinguished from unguided
actions such as machine failure, with intended consequences, as distinguished
from inadvertent consequences, the problem is most amenable to policy
intervention. 34
29. Rochefort & Cobb, supra note 8, at 56 ("Rhetoric can help lodge a particular understanding
of a problem in the minds of the public and protagonists.").
30. Stone, supra note 5, at 282 ("Problem definition is a process of image making, where the
images have to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and responsibility.").
31. Id.
32. Id. Stone explains how one version of the narrative, the horror story, can be offered to
"represent the universe of cases" and used "to build support for changing an entire rule or policy
that is addressed to the larger universe," in spite of the fact that often "these stories are not only
atypical, but also highly distorted." Id. at 146.
33. DAVID A. ROCHEFORT, AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY 133-36 (1986). Professor
Rochefort argues that every policy problem has four distinct elements: causation, the extensiveness
of the problem, the nature of the problem and the characteristics of the group affected by the
problem.
34. See generally Stone, supra note 5. Professor Stone created a typology of causal stories which
uses two dimensions to understand the nature of causal stories. By categorizing facts along these
two dimension, examining action as either unguided or purposeful and by examining the
consequences as either intended or unintended, she breaks all problems into four categories. All
problems are categorized as either mechanical cause, intentional cause, accidental cause or
inadvertent cause. The two strongest boxes are accidental cause and intentional cause. Problems
categorized as accidental include natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, droughts.
Because we typically consider problems of this type as accidents and beyond human control, it is
difficult to move a problem perceived as accidental onto the public policy agenda. By direct
contrast, problems categorized an intentional are ones in which a public policy approach is most
called for. Here the action was purposeful and lead to an intended, albeit undesirable,
consequence. Stone offers John Manville's conduct in hiding the dangers of asbestos while
20091
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Second, the severity of the problem is important. 35 It makes sense that an
issue is more likely to be perceived as a problem worthy of policy attention if it
is perceived as being a serious problem. If it affects a large number of people it
is more likely to get attention than if it affects a small number. Serious effects
on a small number of people can also move an issue from a condition to a
problem. Global warming provides a good example. The Bush I
Administration acknowledged the existence of a global warming problem, but
characterized the problem as relatively minor, not worthy of policy measures
that would protect the environment at the expense of the economy.36 Here,
statistics are typically offered to support the conclusion that a problem exists
and it is severe, 37 or as in the case of global warming, that the effects were
minor and, therefore, a public policy response is not needed.
Third, the scope or magnitude of the problem in terms of people affected is
an important component of problem definition. Here, the change over time is
also an important factor. In other words, if the problem is growing, rather than
remaining stable or declining on its own, it is more likely to be one seen as a
problem worthy of public policy attention. 38 Stone notes that most discussions
of problems "begin with a recitation of figures purporting to show that a
problem is big or growing, or both." 39 A story that highlights a problem that is
increasing in intensity, and uses evidence to support that story, is most
effective. 40 If a problem can be characterized as a "crisis" it is even more likely
to move up on the public policy agenda. 41
Fourth, an issue can gain attention if it is seen as "hitting close to home" or
continuing to expose their employees to asbestos as an example of a problem that fits within this
box. Problems that fit within the inadvertent box (purposeful action; unintended consequence) are
also likely to be amenable to public policy. Problems that are categorized in this box by Stone
include consequences that are unforeseen or caused by carelessness. See infra notes 64-74 and
accompanying text discussing how the narratives in the tort tales have been discussed in a way that
attributes blame and describes causation.
35. Rochefort & Cobb, supra note 8, at 15-26. Rochefort and Cobb assert that a social problem
may be understood across many dimensions. They discuss the key aspects of problem definition as
ones involving the severity of the problem, its incidence, its novelty, its proximity, the perceived
crisis nature of the problem, the characteristics of the crisis population, ends-means orientation of
the problem solved, and the nature of the solution.
36. How this issue has been re-characterized recently is a prime example of re-definition. As the
problem has been redefined as a serious problem, attributed to man-made action that impacts us all,
it has moved onto the public policy agenda.
37. Houston & Richardson, supra note 5, at 486. The use of key statistics is also important in
making clear that the issue being described is not an isolated event.
38. Id. See also Stone, supra note 5, at 138. This is what Stone refers to as the story of decline.
She tells us that "lilt run likes this: 'In the beginning, things were pretty good. But they got worse.
In fact, right now, they are nearly intolerable. Something must be done.' The story usually ends
with a prediction of crisis - there will be some kind of breakdown, collapse, or doom-and a
proposal for some steps to avoid the crisis." See also KINGDON, supra note 26, at 91 ("A steady state
is viewed as less problematic than changing figures.").
39. Stone, supra note 5, at 163. See also id. at 172-177 (discussing the importance of numbers in
telling the causal story).
40. Rochefort & Cobb, supra note 8, at 60. "Whether a problem exists, how bad it is, who or
what is responsible, and what future trends will occur are all perceptions that can depend on the
measuring approach used." Id. at 61. Rochefort and Cobb use examples of the poverty rate and




The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
directly affecting the public. 42 Moreover, the characteristics of the problem
population are important in problem definition. Whether the affected group is
seen as worthy or unworthy, familiar or strange, culpable or innocent is part of
this dimension.43 Another part of this dimension is whether the affected
populations are characterized as sympathetic or threatening.
Fifth, the nature of the solution can help define the problem. The
availability or lack thereof of an acceptable solution is an important factor in the
extent to which a problem is defined and moved onto the public policy
agenda.44 Moreover, it is important if the solution offered is feasible, both
technologically and economically.
Last, a story that uses accepted values as part of the narrative is more
effective in defining a problem in a way that will lead to the desired action. An
effective causal story alludes to accepted key values as a "normative
justification for the articulated causal theory and solutions" offered. 45
We know the importance of problem definition both in terms of moving an
issue onto the public policy agenda and in terms of support for any solution
advocated. Moreover, we know how narratives can be useful in constructing a
story that creates the perception of a problem and leads to desired solutions. To
be effective, the story must point blame; it must characterize the problem as
severe, one that affects a large portion of the population, one that is worsening
over time. It must be seen as directly affecting the public and must characterize
the population protected as deserving; the story must include a ready-made
solution and that solution must be feasible. Last, the story must appeal to core
American values. An effective narrative in the public policy context, just like
any effective narrative, will use symbols and metaphors 46 to define the
problem. We have just such a story in the case of tort reform in general and
class actions in particular.47
42. Id.
43. See infra notes 62-67 (discussing characterization of the plaintiffs in class action cases as
greedy and unworthy).
44. Rochefort & Cobb, supra note 8, at 168-172. Related to this is the ends-means orientation of
those defining the problem can be relevant. In other words, in some situations the issue is defined
by its attachment to a desired end; in other cases, the means and not the ends are important.
Rochefort and Cobb use as an example the controversy over distributing sterile needles to IV drug
users as a way to prevent the spread of AIDS. Some focus on the end (disease prevention) and
some focus on the means (distributing needles to drug users). This distinction defines the problem.
45. Houston & Richardson, supra note 4, at 486. See also Sandra M. Anglund, How American
Core Values Influence Public Policy: Lessons from Federal Aid to Small Business, 1953-1993, 11
GOVERNANCE: INTL J. OF POL'Y & ADMIN. 23 (2000) (discussing how the use of core values in
problem definition affected public policy treatment of aid to small businesses).
46. Stone, supra note 5, at 137. Professor Stone asserts that "symbolic representation is the
essence of problem definition in politics." Daniels & Martin, supra note 6, at 78 ("Relying on
symbols and symbolic devices in political discourse is an appeal to shared values, preferably deeply
held values, and involves the manipulation of those values in order to achieve political gain");
Kingdon, supra note 25, at 97 (discussing how a powerful symbol can work as a focusing event
moving a problem onto the public policy agenda). See generally MURRAY EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING
THE POLITICAL SPECTACLE (1988); MURRAY EDELMAN, POLITICAL LANGUAGE: WORDS THAT SUCCEED
AND POLICIES THAT FAIL (1977). We will see in the case of class actions that the predominant
metaphor is that of a game.
47. Rochefort & Cobb, supra note 8, at 59. This discussion focuses almost exclusively on how a
causal story can be used to define the problem. As such, it ignores aspects of problem definition
related to what has been termed problem ownership. Consideration of problem ownership looks to
2009]
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II. PART II: THE STORY
The day after a verdict had been entered against his client, the lawyer rushed to the
judge's chambers, demanding that the case be reopened, saying: "I have new evidence
that makes a huge difference in my client's defense." The judge asked, "Mhat new
evidence could you have?" The lawyer replied, "My client has an extra $10,000, and I
just found out about it!"
A. Tort Rhetoric in General
Problem definition has played a crucial role in the movement to reform the
tort litigation system. Advocates for reform have used causal stories,
metaphors and symbols to define the problem, move it onto the public policy
agenda and dictate the solutions chosen. The degree to which tort anecdotes 48
have provided the impetus for reform is generally accepted. Tort tales provide
a tale of morally blameworthy individuals (the plaintiffs) who beset blameless,
responsible and hardworking individuals (the defendants) aided by the most
blameworthy of all-the lawyer.49 And according to the story, there are lots of
these lawsuits. We are in the midst of a litigation explosion.
1. The Story: Lamented Changes
Recall, that a story is most effective if it is a story of decline. The tort reform
story is a perfect example. Tort reformers paint a picture of a legal landscape
that changed dramatically for the worse as new legal theories changed the tort
litigation system in the 1960s and the 1970s.50 The move to cap punitive
find people with, "special status and educational attainment," who are highly respected and seen as
having the legitimacy to deal with the issue. Connecting such people to a problem can help move
the issue onto the public policy agenda. Peter J. May, Reconsidering Policy Design: Policies and
Publics, 11 J. OF PUB. POL'Y 187, 190 (1991). Moreover, Professor May argues that whether the
problem is what he terms a policy with a public or a policy without a public will affect the policy
design and implementation. He defines "publics" as an "identifiable groupings who have more
than a passing interest in a given issue debate or are actively involved in an issue debate." They
include professional associations, consumer groups, trade groups and public interest groups.
Policies with publics are issues with "well developed coalitions of interest groups" surrounding the
issue; policies without publics are issues with limited interest group interest, often limited to
technical communities. He suggests that issues that are "immediate, individualized and recurring"
are likely to attract publics. These are often characterized as "private" as opposed to "public" risks.
According to May, "publics are central to issue emergence, problem definition, and policy design."
Id. at 193.
48. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 2, at 5. Termed "tort deform anecdotes" by Ralph Nader
and Wesley Smith, they are arguably "promulgated to mislead the public about the civil litigation
system." Thornburg, supra note 13, at 1122-1131. Thornburg titles one of the sections in her article
"Smoke and Mirrors: The Marketing of Anecdotes" and uses examples to show the power of such
marketing.
49. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 2, at 62. ("Stock characters in tort tales may include greedy
plaintiffs, avaricious ambulance chasers, Robin Hoods, mendacious witnesses, scientists for hire,
and witless judges and juries, dramatis personae who abound in modem American culture and
politics.").
50. See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 7, at 82-84 (discussing application of the tort
reform rhetoric to the story of decline). See also WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION:
WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAwSUTrr (Plume 1991) (comparing the current
problems with the litigation system to better times). A number of commentators have written about
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damages serves as example. The rhetoric's storyline is that punitive damages
are awarded routinely, with increasing frequency, leading to a host of problems
illustrated primarily by horror story anecdotes. 51  Another example most
relevant to this article is the advent of the class action lawsuit. Victims who
before had no avenue for redress are now bringing class action suits in ever
increasing numbers. 52
Moreover, the situation is declining rapidly. According to the rhetoric, we
see both the number and size of awards awarded by "runaway juries" 53
"rocketing out of control," and "exploding out of control" in recent years. 54 We
hear about an "epidemic" of civil litigation.55 We are the "world's most
litigious nation."56 Here, the story uses numbers to show that the problem is
bad and getting worse. We hear that there are 18 million civil lawsuits filed per
year; the sheer number suggests "runaway litigiousness." 57 We hear of a 758%
increase in products liability filings. 58 Tort reform horror stories always
include the amount of the award. For example, the impact of the McDonald's
coffee story isn't just that the plaintiff won, it is that she won $2.3 million.59
From this we are asked to conclude that the sizes of awards are growing.60
the changing legal landscape. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, The Death of Causation: Mass Products
Torts' Incomplete Incorporation of Social Welfare Programs, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943 (2006);
Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 22, at 1026-1085 (2005).
51. Daniels & Martin, supra note 7, at 85. One such anecdote asserts that Monsanto cancelled a
program to develop a substitute for asbestos because of fear of punitive damage awards. Another
anecdote relates that pharmaceutical companies are not pursuing development or distribution of an
AIDS vaccine because of the high cost of vaccine-related injuries. Id. at 85-86.
52. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 2, at 38. According to Haltom and McCann, the "potential
for big awards in class-action cases as well as the rapid growth in punitive damage awards
generally together boosted the material as well as moral incentives for attorneys on contingency
fees to take cases for group interests previously underrepresented in the political and legal system."
53. Thornburg, supra note 13, at 1100.
54. Daniels & Martin, supra note 7, at 87-89 (discussing the use of terms such as "exploding"
and "skyrocketing" to convey a sense of urgency and decline).
55. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 2, at 6. The word "epidemic" connotes the metaphor of
disease. See Stone, supra note 4, at 152-153 where she discusses the impact of the disease metaphor.
56. Rhode, supra note 13, at 467. As Rhode points out, it doesn't matter that this isn't true
("Scholars have debunked this claim so often that it is startling how much bunk survives.")
President Bush complains, "We're a litigious society; everybody is suing, it seems like. There are too
many lawsuits in America..." Id. at 451. Rhode also points out that the perception of an increase in
propensity to sue isn't accurate. Americans were actually more likely to sue a century ago than
they are now. Id at 456.
57. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 2, at 53. The 18 million civil suit assertion was made by
Vice President Dan Quayle. As Haltom and McCann point out, the United States only had 18
million civil suits if every divorce and child support case was included. But, of course, the accuracy
of the number isn't the issue. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
58. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 2, at 53. Again, the accurate figure is closer to 400% and
most of that increase was due to asbestos cases. Uncontested divorces actually account for the
largest growth in recent lawsuits. Rhode, supra note 13, at 457. Moreover, a study by the Court
Statistics Project of the National Center for State Courts found that between 1993 and 2004, tort
filings decreased by 5% and contract filings increased by 21%. Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 21, at
1082.
59. Of course, the story doesn't work as well if we mention that the judge reduced the amount
of the award to $640,000 or that the plaintiff actually settled for less to avoid an appeal. Rhode,
supra note 11, at 455.
60. There is some evidence that the size of tort awards is increasing, but they are rising at about
the same rate as the increase in medical costs. Rhode, supra note 13, at 458. See generally Deborah R.
Hensler, Jurors in the Material World: Putting Tort Verdicts in their Social Context, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS
2009]
Journal of Legislation
2. The Bad Guys - The Lawyers and the Greedy Plaintiffs
Every story needs a villain. This story has two-the greedy and
undeserving plaintiff and the greedy lawyer. The plaintiff in the story of tort
reform is never painted as an injured plaintiff seeking compensation for life-
changing injuries. Instead, the popular metaphor is one of a lottery winner.
Our plaintiff has hit the jackpot; 61 he is one who sues out of self-interest- to
obtain a windfall. 62 He is a winner in the "litigation lottery." 63 The plaintiffs in
this story are always described as irresponsible -the man who climbs a ladder,
falls and blames the ladder manufacturer, the man who uses the lawnmower as
a hedge clipper and then blames the lawnmower manufacturers for his injury -
unwilling to accept responsibility for their own stupidity. They are
irresponsible, or worse -dishonest. 64  These plaintiffs are stigmatized as
undeserving of the awards that they are reaping. 65 They are characterized as
"opportunistic plaintiffs who evade personal responsibility by carelessly
misusing products, performing dangerous practices, showing bad judgment at
odds with common sense, and then selfishly resorting to unjustified legal
blaming and claiming of remedies against virtuous others ... ."66
Even as we blame the greedy plaintiffs, we never forget the true villain-
the plaintiff's lawyer. 67 The lawyer is held forth as the chief "culprit"
U. L. REV. 8, 9 (2008) (comparing the "magnitude and growth rate of jury verdicts issued from 1992
through 2001 in the nation's largest state trial courts with the material rewards accorded others -
particularly executives at large corporations - as reported by the mass media").
61. Examples of the lottery winner or jackpot metaphor are everywhere. See, e.g., Daniels &
Martin, supra note 7, at 86 ("Who loses with these reform proposals? Only plaintiff lawyers and
their already compensated clients who have hit the punitive damages jackpot.") (quoting Richard J.
Mahoney, Punitive Damages: The Courts are Curbing Creativity, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1988, § 3, at 3).
62. Martins & Daniels, supra note 7, at 87. Similar to the lottery winner metaphor, the use of the
word "windfall" conveys a reward that is undeserving.
63. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 2, at 20, 54-55 (discussing the importance of slogans in
framing the problem).
64. Daniels & Martin, supra note 7, at 92 ("The unscrupulousness of the plaintiffs in these
stories is palpable ... Such plaintiffs, the stories tell us, are people without integrity or a sense of
responsibility. They are simply dishonest"); Thornburg, supra note 13, at 1100 ("Workers and other
plaintiffs were portrayed not as persons trying to enforce the law and deter misbehavior, or even as
injured victims of the wrongs of others, but as whiners who failed to take personal responsibility for
their own problems."). As Haltom and McCann point out, it is interesting that the story never
focuses on the irresponsibility or greed of the corporate defendant. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note
2, at 20-21 (discussing how the stories "blame social problems on pathologies of individual
irresponsibility, negligence, and greed among plaintiffs or their attorneys obsessed with rights
claiming, rather than on incidents of corporate irresponsibility or the deficiencies of our public
regulatory or insurance systems"). See Dawn House, Tort Reform - What about the Little Guy?, 39
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 819, 819 (2006) (arguing that the "voices and experiences" of the injured parties
"have gone unheard").
65. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 2, at 24 (Plaintiffs are "stigmatized as 'undeserving' in
much the same was as are the welfare poor, the unemployed, the homeless.., and other 'deviants'
in American society."). Haltom and McCann reprint two advertisements by Aetna Life and
Casualty to illustrate the importance of individual responsibility - or the lack of it. One tells us that
the "entitlement mentality" of the plaintiff has a terrible effect on U.S. society. It is, thus, "time to
restore the principles of self-reliance and personal responsibility" to our civil justice system. Id. at
47.
66. Id., at 59.
67. See generally Lisa G. Lerman, Greed Among Lawyers, 30 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 661 (2005)
(where the greedy lawyer is used as an example of the dangers of greed permeating American
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responsible for the pathological tort system.68 He is both greedy and
manipulative. Cursed as a "hungry caterpillar" and compared to a plague of
locusts, the lawyer makes the perfect foil. 69 He is portrayed as a "fat cat" trial
attorney "living in the 'lap of luxury' at the expense of taxpayers and
consumers." He is "making out like a bandit." 70
Even though the story paints a picture of ever increasing judgment
amounts, the plaintiff himself gets too little of the money.71 The contingency
fee is the focus of much of this criticism. Contingent fees encourage lawyers to
bring lawsuits that shouldn't be brought and overcompensate them for the ones
that they win.72 The rhetoric blames contingency fee arrangement for feeding
the lawyer's greed and encouraging him to bring frivolous lawsuits-the
potential reward provides incentives that the greedy lawyer cannot ignore. The
contingency fee encourages self-dealing. 73
In addition, lawyers are crafty and manipulative. They will do anything to
win the case. They use "junk science" to prove causation where there is none.
They bring lawsuits that lack merit. There is an inherent distrust of juries that
underlies the story. Juries swallow the attorney's arguments hook, line and
sinker. 74
society).
68. GALANTER, supra note 23, at 9. See also Thornburg, supra note 13, at 1100 ("An even better
scapegoat were the 'plaintiffs' lawyers' portrayed as greedy parasites trying to make an easy buck
by scaring companies into settling frivolous lawsuits.").
69. Rhode, supra note 13, at 450.
70. Id. at 452.
71. Id. at 460-461. The way the story is constructed focuses on the greed of the lawyer, rather
than on the inefficiency of the system. The following lawyer joke says it all: A group of dinner
guests were blaming all of America's troubles on lawyers when a woman said, "They aren't all so
bad. Why, last year a lawyer gave me $1000." "I don't believe it," the host responded. "It's true, I
swear it," said the woman. "I had a complicated personal injury case and what with the lawyer's
fee, the cost of expert witnesses, the expense of the appeal and so on, my bill was $41,000. When the
judgment only amounted to $40,000, my lawyer simply forgave the difference." Arguably, a system
that relies on litigation to compensate most injuries is inefficient and that inefficiency naturally
leads to undercompensating its victims.
72. Again a lawyer joke provides the story: A client asked her lawyer "What is a contingent
fee?" The lawyer answered, "A contingent fee means if I don't win your suit, I get nothing. If I do
win it, you get nothing."
73. Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1492 (2007). See also
Steven B. Hantler, Mark A. Behrens, & Leah Lorber, Is the "Crisis" in the Civil Justice System Real or
Imagined?, 38 LOY. L. REV. 1121, 1141 (2005) (" [Ciontingency fees provide plaintiffs' lawyers with a
perverse incentive to file speculative claims specifically to obtain quick settlements, either 'nuisance
settlements' with small businesses who can little afford to pay for a protracted legal fight, or
'blackmail settlements' with large companies facing onerous and expensive litigation."). This, of
course, ignores the fact that the lawyer who brings a lawsuit under a contingency fee arrangement
will not be paid at all unless he wins. Haltrom and McCann cite studies that show that lawyers
serve as gatekeepers and reject far more cases than they undertake. HALTROM & MCCANN, supra
note 2, at 85. The rhetoric about contingency fees also ignore the fact that studies have shown that
the average contingency recovery is no more than a recovery by a lawyer who bills hourly.
Moreover, it ignores the public interest that can be served by some lawsuits. Rhode, supra note 13,
at 466-467. See e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE
LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 189 (2004). Thus, we have two views of the contingency fee.
See generally Davies, supra note 29, at 136 ("Depending on one's view, contingent fee financing of
tort litigation is either the key to allowing people without means access to the legal system or the
cause of many of the perceived ills of the tort system.").
74. See, e.g., Hantler, Behrens & Lorber, supra note 74, at 1168-1173 where they discuss the
"fact" that juries lack reliable information and, therefore, cannot render a fair verdict.
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3. The Victims - The Innocent Defendants
The defendants are victimized in two ways. First, they are victimized by
the huge and unjustified awards. In this part of the story, even if the defendant
is in any way at fault, the amount of the award to the plaintiff is
disproportionate to the defendant's wrongdoing. Arguably, the McDonald's
coffee case illustrates this. Even if we accept the fact that McDonald's coffee
was too hot, the story asks us to believe that the damages were excessive.
Alternatively, the defendants are victims of frivolous lawsuits. The defendant
has done nothing wrong, but it is being forced to litigate a meritless lawsuit.75
The story tells us that the mere threat of a lawsuit punishes the defendants and
affects us all.
4. The Good Guys
In this story, the innocent victims are not just confined to the hapless
defendants. We all suffer. The costs of the current system "are ultimately paid
by innocent consumers, taxpayers, policyholders and stockholders." 76 These
lawsuits "terrorize small business owners and drive doctors out of practice." 77
It is because of lawsuits that medical services are unavailable in some parts of
the country. 78 It is because of lawsuits that the costs of our consumer goods are
so high. After all, we all pay the "tort tax." 79 By some estimates, our tort
system costs each American on average $809 per year.80 It is because of
75. There is debate about the percentage of cases that are frivolous. See, e.g., Sebok, supra note
74, at 1470-1471 (discussing the extent to which medical malpractice cases are justified).
76. Daniels & Martin, supra note 7, at 88. See also Thornburg, supra note 13, at 1102. Thornburg
details a public relations campaign conducted by the Insurance Information Institute in 1986 in
which they ran print ads touting, "The Lawsuit Crisis is Bad for Babies," and "The Lawsuit Crisis is
Penalizing School Sports."
77. Rhode, supra note 13, at 451 (quoting President George W. Bush). Bush continued, "[N]o
one has ever been healed by a frivolous lawsuit."
78. See, e.g., HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 2, at 3. President Reagan blamed the tort litigation
system with this tort tale: "Last year a jury awarded one woman a million dollars in damages. She
claimed that a CAT scan had destroyed her psychic powers. (Laughter.) Well, recently a new trial
was ordered in that case, but the excesses of the courts have taken their toll. As a result, in some
parts of the country, women haven't been able to find doctors to deliver their babies, and other
medical services have become scarce and expensive." But see TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE MYTH 1 (2005) ("[B]uilt on a foundation of urban legend myths mixed with the
occasional true story, supported by selective references to academic studies, and repeated so often
that even the mythmakers forget the exaggeration, half truth and outright misinformation
employed in the service of their greater good, the medical malpractice myth has filled doctors,
patients, legislators, and voters with the kind of fear that short circuits critical thinking.").
79. The so-called "tort tax" is the "aggregate costs to the U.S. economy of tort liability. It was
estimated that the tort tax may amount to $300 billion a year at the same time it was acknowledged
that this was at best a guess. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 2, at 54. Once more, the factual
accuracy of these claims are irrelevant. See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 13, at 1102 ("Empirical
research again demonstrated that the message of cost to consumers and disappearance of
innovative products was 'fundamentally false - the product of dubious anecdotes, questionable
research, concocted statistics, factual and legal misstatements, and willful disregard of
contradictory evidence.") (quoting Kenneth Jost, Tampering with Evidence: The Liability and
Competitive Myths, 78 A.B.A. J. 44, 45 (1992)).
80. Hantler, Behrens, & Lorber, supra note 74, at 1124-25. By other estimates, the tort tax costs
the average U.S. consumer $1000 each year and costs the economy $246 billion a year. See also
Andreeva, supra note 2, at 399 (citing statistics showing that the tort system "consumes up to 3
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
lawsuits that insurance premiums have risen so dramatically. 81 It is because of
lawsuits that businesses refrain from developing and distributing valuable
products. It is because of lawsuits that pharmaceutical companies refrain from
developing new vaccines. The AIDS patient who cannot get an AIDS vaccine
suffers. 82 All medical costs rise as doctors engage in "defensive medicine,"
ordering needless tests to protect themselves from litigation. It is because of
litigation that American businesses find it harder to compete with foreign
competitors. 83
Thus, who benefits from reform? The "whole country wins with important
gains in jobs, new and improved products, international competitiveness -and
a fairer legal system for all." 84
B. Class Action Rhetoric
The class action lawsuit specifically has been the subject of critical
commentary. 85 The rhetoric surrounding class actions lawsuits mirrors the
rhetoric discussed above with a few refinements. Most importantly, we will see
how the way the story is told framed the problem in a way that clamored for
public policy response. There is a class action "crisis" driven in large part by
the notion that class action lawsuits are brought and managed by the plaintiffs'
attorneys "without providing any real benefit to society." 86  There is an
"explosion" of class action "extortion." Again, the story has good guys, bad
guys, victims and a ready solution.
1. The Story: Lamented Changes
Called the "messiest" part of the civil justice system, the class action has
been likened to the "equivalent of high-stakes poker." 87 Class action lawsuits
that were once brought seeking injunctive relief, or asserting civil rights or
percent of [the U.S.] gross domestic product").
81. The extent to which increased premiums are due to increases in the size of awards is
unclear. See generally Rhode, supra note 13, at 458-459 ("How much effect large damage awards
have on policy costs is subject to debate.").
82. The rhetoric asserts that pharmaceutical companies fail to develop new drugs and vaccines
because of fears of lawsuits. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
83. Rhode, supra note 13, at 461. It has, in fact, been estimated that tort liability costs represent
2 percent of the total expense of U.S. goods and services.
84. Daniels & Martin, supra note 7, at 86 (quoting Richard J. Mahoney, Punitive Damages: The
Courts are Curbing Creativity, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1988, § 3, at 3).
85. See generally Debra Lyn Bassett, Constructing Class Action Reality, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1415
(2006); Anne Bloom, From Justice to Global Peace, A (Brief) Genealogy of the Class Action Crisis, 39 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 719 (2006); Mohsen Manesh, The New Class Action Rule: Procedural Reforms in an Ethical
Vacuum, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 923 (2005); Katie Melnick, In Defense of the Class Action Lawsuit: An
Examination of the Implicit Advantages and a Response to Common Criticisms, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
CoMMENT. 755 (2008); George F. Sanderson, III, Congressional Involvement in Class Action Reform: A
Survey of Legislative Proposals Past and Present, 2 LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 315 (1999).
86. Bloom, supra note 86, at 720.
87. Hantler, Behrens & Lorber, supra note 74, at 1136-37 (arguing that the "potential costs of




consumer claims now involve damage claims.88 The "explosion" 89 of class
action suits now "flood" the courts. 90 Class action lawsuits are estimated to
have grown by over 1000 percent over last decade. 91 And, the lawsuits are
frivolous. President Bush said, as he signed CAFA into law, "We have a
responsibility to confront frivolous lawsuits head-on."92  We learn that
plaintiffs' attorneys bring unsupported claims against innocent defendants,
forcing them to settle rather than take the risk of a large judgment.93
2. The Bad Guys - The Lawyers and the Greedy Plaintiffs
Our first villains are the class action plaintiffs attracted by the potential for
large awards. 94 However, in the area of class action, the abuses brought about
by the plaintiff spale in comparison to the evildoing of the plaintiffs' attorney.
Characterized as "entrepreneurial," or as "opportunistic aggregators," 95 these
lawyers seek creative ways to bring class action lawsuits, reap huge fees, and
settle lawsuits in ways that benefit themselves rather than their clients. Notice
how the story changes in the class action arena. In the typical tort tale, the
greedy plaintiff contacts a greedy lawyer and they proceed with their frivolous
claim. In the class action tale, the entrepreneurial lawyer himself solicits the
client who has little at stake in the actual lawsuit.96 The class action lawsuit is
88. Bloom, supra note 86, at 726.
89. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 109-14, at 14 (2005) ("[Tlhe explosion of state court class actions have
simply overwhelmed their dockets.").
90. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 109-14, at 13 (pointing out that the "flood of class actions in our state
courts is too well documented to warrant significant discussion, much less debate"); Hantler,
Behrens, & Lorber, supra note 73, at 1137.
91. Bruce Moyer, Class Actions Move to Federal Court, 52 A.P.R. FED. LAW. 10 (2005) (citing Rep.
Rick Keller saying, "[tihese out-of-control lawsuits are killing jobs, they're hurting small business
people who can't afford to defend themselves, and they're hurting consumers who have to pay
more for products"). While class action certification grew by 1000% in state courts, they grew by
338% in federal courts. Hantler, Behrens, & Lorber, supra note 73, at 1137.
92. Moyer, supra note 91, at 10. See also S. REP. No. 109-14, at 14 (asserting that "corporate
defendants are forced to settle frivolous claims to avoid expensive litigation").
93. Andreeva, supra note 1, at 385.
94. Hantler, Behrens, & Lorber, supra note 73, at 1138, n.70 ("The drum-beating that
accompanies a well-publicized class action... may well attract excessive numbers of plaintiffs with
weak to fanciful cases." (citing In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 165 (2d Cir. 1987)).
95. Howard M. Erichson, CAFA's Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1596-
97 (2008 )("CAFA's proponents successfully portrayed class action lawyers as opportunistic
aggregators who get rich on litigation of their own making, with little control by clients, little
remedy for each client, and few clients who even care enough to sue.").
96. Melnick, supra note 85, at 757-58 ("This traditional view of the attorney is largely perverted
in the forum of class action litigation, where it is often the attorney himself who solicits the client,
turning himself into more of a 'calculating entrepreneur' than the quintessential advocate."). In
what is obviously a version of the classic ambulance chasing story, Melnick asserts that "[plerhaps
the most egregious example of client solicitation comes on the heels of a mass disaster, where the
attorney attempts to gain access to the suffering families in their time of need and, under the guise
of consoling the grief stricken family, encourages them to file suit." Id. at 759. She then concludes
that the issue arises "with the behavior of the attorneys, who seem to forget that they are in fact
representing injured individuals and appear to be arguing for nothing more than their own
monetary gain." Id. at 763. The most frequent symbol invoked here is that of the bounty hunter.
See, e.g., Myriam Giles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modem Class
Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005).
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the "brainchild" of the attorney with little input from his client. 97 They are, in
many ways, lawyers who do not have to be responsible to their individual
clients.98 These lawyers will happily "sell out a class.., in exchange for
generous attorneys' fees." 99 They are characterized as "set[ting] themselves up
to receive windfalls from eventual settlements, using clients as mere pawns in
their (the attorneys) eventual recovery." 10 0 Notice, in this scenario, it is the
lawyers who receive the windfalls, not the clients. We are told that the lawyers
receive the "real bonanza." 101
The lawyer in this story is portrayed as greedy and the typical fee
arrangement in class actions is the way he feeds this greed. 10 2 We have already
discussed the criticisms of the contingency fee arrangement. 10 3  The
contingency fee arrangement, however, works a little differently in the class
action context. In the class action context, each individual plaintiff stands to
recover a small amount; the only person who truly stands to gain is the lawyer.
In the typical class action case, the lawyers receive a disproportionate share of
the settlement or award. 104 The lawyer in this story is portrayed as more
concerned for his own financial reward than for the rights of his client.10 5 The
lawyer in this story wants to "settle early, receive his paycheck, and avoid
97. Melnick, supra note 85, at 759.
98. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There will be Lawyers without Clients or
Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 143 (2001)("[Tihe class is entirely a creation of the lawyer: class
counsel control its beginning, its end, its shape and its conduct"); Melnick, supra note 85, at 770
("[T]he client in class action litigation is an amorphous group and the attorney is ultimately
responsible to the group as a whole, not to any individual member. Without a specific client to
keep him in check, the existence of the entrepreneurial attorney has emerged. Such an attorney
exists to further his own self-interests as opposed to furthering the interests of his client."). They
are, of course, subject to ethical obligations to these clients. See Natalie C. Scott, Don't Forget Me!
The Client in a Class Action Lawsuit, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 561, 562 (expressing concerns because
attorneys in class action lawsuits represent multiple clients whom they have never met). See also
Manesh, supra note 85, at 924 ("Absent any meaningful monitoring by class members, class
attorneys are free to operate largely on self-interest, subject only to the restraints of judicial
oversight and ethical responsibilities.").
99. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002). See, e.g., J. Brendan Day,
My Lawyer Went to Court and All I Got Was This Lousy Coupon! The Class Action Fairness Act's
Inadequate Provision for Judicial Scrutiny Over Proposed Coupon Settlements, 38 SETON HALL L. REV.
1085, 1094 (discussing how "counsel autonomy significantly increases the risk of collusion between
lawyer and defendant"); Koniak & Cohen, supra note 98, at 145-150 (discussing the ways in which
lawyers can manipulate the system in their own self interest); Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts -
Messy Ethics, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1228, 1231 (1995) (discussing the questionable ethics of "sell-out
lawyers who, for millions in fees, are willing to sign away the rights of tens of thousands of faceless
and lawyerless class members"). See also Koniak & Cohen, supra note 98, at 145-150 for a discussion
of the ways in which lawyers can manipulate the system in their own self interest.
100. Melnick, supra note 85, at 758.
101. Id. at 759.
102. "The class action judicial system has become a joke, and no one is laughing except the trial
lawyers ... all the way to the bank." 151 CONG. REC. H726 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of
Rep. Sensenbrenner).
103. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
104. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 14-20, for cases in which lawyers receive disproportionate share of
settlements.
105. See Melnick, supra note 85, at 766 where she describes the inherent conflict of interest ("This
can lead to tensions between the attorney and the class members as the attorney has an incentive to
settle early and therefore maximize his possible payout .... The perversion of the contingency fee
within the class action context lies within these dueling interests.").
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litigation" even at the expense of his own client. 10 6 Moreover, in too many
class action settlements plaintiffs receive coupons of little value and their
lawyers get millions.10 7 In a so-called "coupon settlement," the plaintiff
receives a coupon offering a discount on future products or services provided
by the defendant instead of a monetary award.108 The plaintiff who doesn't
want to purchase any products in the future from the defendant receives
nothing. For example, in one Texas class action Blockbuster customers were
provided coupons for free movie rentals; at the same time, their attorneys
received $9.25 million in fees and expenses. 10 9  Moreover, the lawyer's
contingency fee is calculated as a percentage of the coupons provided by the
defendant, rather than as a percentage of the coupons actually redeemed by the
plaintiffs. This results in the disproportionate award that feeds our story of
greed.
Moreover, these lawyers are crafty. They work to "game" the system.110
Because the "modem class action is frequently won or lost at certification," 111
in our story, lawyers "shop" for the forum most likely to certify the case. First,
it is posited that state courts are more likely to certify a case than federal
courts. 112 Therefore, our lawyer is described as using "various tricks" to escape
106. Melnick, supra note 85, at 768. See also Martha Pacold, Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions
Governed by Fee-Shifting Statutes, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1008 (2001) (discussing the incentives
created in actions governed by fee-shifting provisions and noting that "[t]he result is an enormous
incentive for plaintiffs' attorneys in hybrid class actions to settle, possibly at the expense of their
dispersed, and often unknown, clients"). This ignores, however, the fact that, especially in a class
action context, the typical plaintiff could not afford to bring the action at all without a contingency
fee arrangement. See Melnick, supra note 107, at 769 ("Contingency fees therefore serve the dual
purpose of allowing both the individual who cannot afford to litigate and the individual who
would not have an economic incentive to litigate, into the courtroom.").
107. Georgene M. Vairo, Developments in the Law, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 39 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 797, 980 (2006). Coupon settlements have been likened to the "class action equivalent
to squeegee boys splashing water on a clean windshield expecting to get paid for a problem they
created." Day, supra note 99, at 1098. See 151 CONG. REC. H.726 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement
of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (the pre-CAFA class action lawsuit produced "outrageous settlements that
benefit only lawyers and trample the rights of class members").
108. Laurens Walker, The Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights: A Policy and Political Mistake, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 849, 859 (2007). See generally Inez Friedman-Boyce, Head's up on the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, 49 OcT B. B.J. 6 (2005); Anthony Rollo & Gabriel A. Crowson, Mapping the New
Class Action Frontier - A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act and Amended Federal Rule 23, 59
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 11, 12 (2005). These are sometimes called script, voucher or non-
pecuniary settlements. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT
OF 2005 10 (2005), http://www.classactionprofessor.com/cafa-analysis.pdf.
109. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 15-20 (provides examples of coupon settlements). See also, Davis
v. Carl Cannon Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 298 (11th Cir. 1999) (Nangle, J., concurring)
(critiquing coupon settlements). Other examples include an action against GM Truck where the
plaintiffs received a coupon to buy another GM truck and the attorneys received $9.5 million and a
Ford Bronco II case in which the plaintiffs received a warning sticker, a safe driving videotape, a
road atlas, an owner's manual, a flashlight and a free vehicle inspection and the attorneys requested
$4 million in fees. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 10. See also Day, supra note 99, at 1100-1105
(discussing the "horror stories" of coupon settlements).
110. The metaphor of the plaintiffs' attorney "gaming" the system is the most frequent metaphor
invoked. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 4 ("[C]urrent law enables lawyers to 'game' the procedural
rules .... In this environment, consumers are the big losers.").
111. Recent Case, Seventh Circuit Holds that Denial of Class Certification Can have Preclusive Effect in
State and Federal Courts, In re Bridgestone/ Firestone, Inc., Tires Products Liability Litigation, 333 F.3d 763
(7h Cir. 2003), 117 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2031 (2004).
112. Allan Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act in a Truly Fair Manner, 80 TUL. L. REV.
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federal court jurisdiction. 113 Moreover, ever mindful of the crafty defense
lawyer, plaintiffs' lawyers engage in "artful pleading" to avoid removal to
federal court.114  In addition, some state courts are better than others. Our
lawyer, through his guile, seeks out a jurisdiction populated by judges who are
amenable to class certification. Termed, "judicial hellholes," these are court
systems alleging to be unfair to defendants.11 5 An example of one such
jurisdiction is Madison County, Illinois. Citing the large numbers of class
actions filed even where there is no evidence that the residents of that county
are "somehow cursed or more plagued by injuries than the average citizen,"
one Congressman suggested that the only reasonable explanation was
"aggressive forum shopping by trial lawyers to find courts and judges who will
act as willing accomplices in a judicial power grab, hearing nationwide cases
and setting policy for the entire country." 116 The lawyer who is able to get a
class action certified can use the certification as "judicial blackmail" to force the
defendant to settle even marginal claims.117 He can engage in "drive-by class
1645, 1654 (2006) (citing a study of 43 class action cases involving life insurance marketing practices,
which found that the cases were more than twice as likely to be certified in state court as compared
to federal court, for the proposition that "[tihe federal court's reluctance to issue class certification is
well documented"). By some estimates, approximately sixty percent of all class actions filed in 2000
were filed in state court. See Warren W. Harris & Erin Glenn Busby, Highlights of the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, 72 DEF. COUNS. J. 228, 228 (2005).
The conclusion that federal courts are more willing to certify class actions than state courts was
apparently reached without reliance on empirical data. See generally Thomas E. Willging &
Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does it
Make? 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 597 (2006) ("[D]espite the force with which conclusions have
been asserted, there had been no quantitative empirical examination of the differences in the
treatment of class actions in state and federal courts... The dearth of data left policymakers and
proponents of change with little choice but to rely on anecdotes and assumptions or wait for more
reliable data."). See infra notes 198-199 and accompanying text.
113. Mark A. Behrens & Andrew W. Crouse, The Evolving Civil Justice Reform Movement:
Procedural Reforms have Gained Steam, but Critics Still Focus on Arguments of the Past, 31 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 173, 174 (2006).
114. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 20-21, for a discussion of the use of class action device as "judicial
blackmail" to settle marginal claims.
115. These judicial hellholes are jurisdictions amenable to plaintiffs' claims. The most famous
magnet jurisdictions are Madison County, Illinois and Miller County, Arkansas. See, e.g., Friedman-
Boyce, supra note 108, at 6. Class Action lawsuit filings in Madison Country, Illinois increased 5000
percent between 1998 and 2005. Andreeva, supra note 1, at 393. See also Roedder, supra note 14, at
443 ("Not long ago Alabama was a venue favored by plaintiff's counsel for the filing of class actions
and the site of very large verdicts.").
For a discussion of what qualifies as a judicial hellholes and a list, see generally AM. TORT REFORM
FOUNDATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004 (2007), available at
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf. The hellhole label persists in spite of the fact
that "empirical research tends to debunk the industry complaints". Thornburg, supra note 11, at
1104 ("For example, a study of actual data from top hellholes Madison and St. Clair Counties in
Illinois concluded that there was 'no support for the 'hellhole' label.'") (quoting Neil Vidmar et al.,
"Judicial Hellholes": Medical Malpractice Claims, Verdicts and the "Doctor Exodus" in Illinois, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 1309, 1341 (2006)). Thornburg points out that the use of the term is "catchy" and asserts that
the "point of the hellhole campaign is not to created an accurate snapshop of reality. The point of
the hellhole campaign is to motivate legislators and judges to make law that will favor repeat
corporate defendants .... Id. at 1099. She goes so far to say that by "sheer repetition" these claims
have gained some credibility, noting that "if you repeat something often enough, people will come
to treat it as general knowledge." Id.
116. Andreeva, supra note 1, at 394 (citing Rep. Sensenbrenner).
117. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7Th Cir. 1995)("[Cilass certification
creates insurmountable pressure on defendants" which forces them to "stake their companies on
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certification," 118 or file copy-cat or duplicative class actions in which courts and
counsel compete with other courts and counsel for control. 119
This part of the story adds the fact that state court judges are also greedy.
For some reason, they want more cases to litigate. In addition, state court
judges have their own reasons for favoring plaintiffs against out-of-state
defendants. 120 They certify to curry political favor among local constituents.
Therefore, state courts cannot be trusted to see through the crafty lawyer.
3. The Victims - The Innocent Defendants and the Poor Plaintiffs
The class action story has two victims: the innocent defendants who are
victims of "drive-by" certifications and judicial "blackmail," and the plaintiffs.
The defendant often settles rather than "rolling the dice" and litigating.121
Moreover, the plaintiffs are victimized when they receive a disproportionately
small recovery while their lawyers receive millions. They end up "feeling as
cheated by their long distance lawyers as by the impersonal corporations" that
injured them.122 One example of how the lawyers can injure their clients occurs
in net-loss settlements. The most famous net-loss case involved a class action
suit alleging that the defendant (Bank of Boston) wrongfully retained surplus
the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they
have no legal liability."). See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 20-21 (discussing how power of the class action
"can give a class attorney unbounded leverage .... Such leverage can essentially force corporate
defendants to pay ransom to class attorneys by settling-rather than litigating -frivolous
lawsuits"). See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement
Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1873, (2006) (discussing the
"contention that class certification might exert undue, illegitimate pressure upon the defendant to
settle").
On the other hand, it has been argued that "[b]y describing class actions as legalized blackmail,
judges have used inflammatory rhetoric that impugns the character of the plaintiffs and trial
lawyers who bring class actins, and of trial judges who certify them." In re Prempro Products
Liability Litig., 230 F.R.D. 555, 573 (E.D. Ark. 2005) (quoting Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death":
Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1357, 1429-30 (2003)). Moreover, the concept of
judicial blackmail ignores the fact that the certification stage of the lawsuit is the most "hotly
litigated" stage in the process and that "when the qualification necessary to certify a class are
combined with the judicial recognition that the certification decision has such a substantial impact
on the outcome of the case, the risk of a truly baseless lawsuit making it through the certification
process becomes minimal." Melnick, supra note 85, at 782.
118. These are cases in which the case is certified before the defendant even knows it has been
sued. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 21-22, for examples.
119. Copy-cat litigation involves a situation where the plaintiffs' attorney files numerous
virtually identical class actions against a large defendant in multiple state courts. Under pre-CAFA
law, the defendant was unable to consolidate the actions or to move them to federal court. This
resulted in the defendant being forced to hire defense counsel in multiple states and was inefficient.
Roedder, supra note 14. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 23 (discussing abuses with copycat lawsuits
because defendants can't consolidate similar cases at state level). See generally Timothy Kerr,
Cleaning Up One Mess to Create Another: Duplicative Actions, Federal Courts' Injunctive Power, and The
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 218 (2006).
120. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 99, at 150-155 (discussing the role of the courts in
perpetuating class action abuse and their "enthusiasm for settlement").
121. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 21 (2005) (discussing how the defendants are "under intense
pressure to settle" rather than "roll these dice"). Recall how prevalent the game metaphor is in this
narrative. See supra note 62-64 and accompanying text.
122. Scott, supra note 99, at 566. The plaintiffs are often drawn into the lawsuit without their
knowledge or consent. In fact, many class action plaintiffs do not even find out about the class
action until they receive notification of the certification in the mail.
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funds in the class members' escrow accounts. Thus, the sole legal issue was the
propriety of the defendant's action in holding the surplus for the extended time
period. An Alabama circuit court approved a settlement in which each class
member received an interest payment of up to $8.76. At the same time, the
court approved attorney's fees in the amount of $8.5 million that were paid
directly out of plaintiff's accounts. Because the fee was calculated as a
percentage of the entire surplus held by the defendant and not as a percentage
of the interest payments actually paid to the plaintiffs, the escrow accounts of
many individual plaintiffs were actually debited by more than the interest
award. This resulted in a net out-of-pocket loss for those class members. 123
4. The Good Guys -The Consumers and American Competitiveness
Worldwide
The good guys in our class action story are no different from the good guys
in the story of tort reform. Again, we all suffer because of class actions abuse.
The fact that so many defendants are forced to settle meritless claims disrupts
the U.S. economy 124 which leads to higher prices for consumers through the so-
called tort tax. We all suffer when state court judges "dictate national policy"
by deciding what amounts to nationwide state class actions. 125
C. Relating the Rhetoric to the Literature
Effective policy stories have a "beginning, a middle, and an end, involving
some change or transformation. They have heroes and villains and innocent
victims, and they pit the forces of evil against the forces of good." 126 As we
have discussed, some elements of the story are more important than others.
First, to be effective in moving a story onto the public policy agenda it must
explain the nature of the problem in a way that attributes blame. These are the
villains of our story. An effective story constructs a story of purposeful action
with intended consequences. As we have seen, in the case of tort reform in
general and class action lawsuits in particular, we have a "ready made villain:
the lawyer." 127 In the class action story, the lawyer seeks out plaintiffs to sue
our innocent defendant. He does so intentionally because the potential for
financial reward is too enticing. Our villain is scheming for the "bonanza,"
using his clients as "pawns" and ready to "sell out" these clients for the "fast
buck." They are the perfect villains. The fact that this characterization fits into
the ready-made characterization of lawyers as part of the overall story of tort
reform just makes it all the more believable. The fact that this characterization
123. Another favorite case to illustrate the abuses addressed here is a case in which consumers
were awarded thirty-three cent checks issued by Chase Manhattan Bank. However, in order to
redeem the check, each plaintiff had to use a thirty-four cent stamp to send in his acceptance. Thus,
while each plaintiff reaped a one-cent loss, the attorneys were rewarded with $4 million in fees. 149
CONG. REC. H5277 (2003) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (cited in Andreeva, supra note 2, at 393).
124. Andreeva, supra note 2, at 398.
125. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 23-25 (2005).
126. STONE, supra note 5, at 138.
127. Daniels & Martin, supra note 7, at 76. See supra notes 95-120 and accompanying text.
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comports with the negative view of lawyers throughout our history makes it all
the easier to sell. They are crafty. They shop for a forum that will best suit their
needs.
Second, the story must be constructed in a way that paints a picture of a
serious problem affecting a large number of worthy people. It should be
increasing in severity over time and is best if characterized as a "crisis." The
story should be constructed in a way where the reader sees himself in the eyes
of the victim. Here, again, the story of the class action crisis fits nicely. We
don't just hear of too many class action lawsuits, we hear that the numbers of
class action lawsuits filed, especially in state courts, are increasing
exponentially. We are in crisis. We portray the victims as innocent defendants
forced to litigate frivolous lawsuits-drive by lawsuits, copy-cat lawsuits. It
just doesn't seem fair. These defendants are always portrayed as innocent. We
rarely hear mention of profit-seeking corporations (no, only the evil plaintiffs'
lawyer seeks profit). More importantly, we all suffer in this story. We care if
the innocent defendant is held up by "judicial blackmail" because, when he
pays, we all pay. We all suffer. Just like in the rhetoric of tort reform, we all
pay a "tort tax" for class action abuse - even, inexplicitly, when the cases are
contract cases.
Third, an effective story uses accepted values as part of the narrative. The
use of symbols can be an important part of constructing this story. The rhetoric
of liability reform has used values such as consumer choice, fairness and equity
to support reform. The importance of individual responsibility is evident in our
story. We are troubled by the irresponsible plaintiff who seeks to force the
defendant, and in fact all of society, to pay for his carelessness. It isn't fair. It
also violates our notions of fairness to allow the plaintiffs' lawyer to hit the
"jackpot" by his abuse of the system. The gaming metaphor is used to remind
us of this inherent unfairness. Of course, it makes sense that advocates for
reform in the class action arena would term their statute the Class Action
Fairness Act. 128 The use of this term is especially effective because it "presumes,
of course, that the existing state of affairs has already been adjudged to be
unfair." 129 The current system is posited as counter to common sense.
III. PART III: THE STORY BEGETS THE LAW: CAFA
Called, "legislation by anecdote," 130 CAFA was the likely solution to the
problem as defined. 131 Interestingly, CAFA is almost entirely a procedural
128. Professors Daniels and Martin point out that the term fairness "has been especially
prominent in the tort reform arena." Daniels & Martin, supra note 7, at 79. See Rick Knight, The
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: A Perspective, FED. LAW., Winter 2005, at 46 ("[Tjhe 'fairness'
portended by the statute's lofty title is illusory at best, and comes at a high and unprincipled
price.").
129. Daniels & Martin, supra note 7, at 79.
130. Burbank, supra note 2, at 1448. CAFA's "message of mistrust was aimed squarely at the
lawyers." See also Erichson, supra note 96, at 1593-1594 (CAFA "was born amidst snide remarks
about lawyers' inventing lawsuits and manipulating the system to enrich themselves at others'
expense.").
131. CAFA was a solution floating in a primeval soup waiting for the policy window to open to
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statute. As such, it garnered little public attention prior to passage. 132
Moreover, it has been the subject of surprisingly little commentary. 133
President Bush signed CAFA into law on February 18, 2005, calling it "a critical
step toward ending the lawsuit culture in our country." 134 Moreover, he
predicted that CAFA "will ease the needless burden of litigation on every
American worker, business, and family." 135 The Findings and Purposes section
of CAFA clearly ties enactment of the Statute to the rhetoric of tort abuse.
136
Congress begins by declaring that "there have been abuses of the class action
couple the streams. See KINGDON, supra note 26.
132. See generally Editorial, Fairness to Whom?, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 8, 2003, at 1OA; The
Class Action Unfairness Act, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at A30 ("Under a phony banner of legal
reform, and aided by an expensive lobbying effort by business interests, the Senate is barreling
ahead on legislation that would severely undermine the ability of Americans to win redress in the
courts for corporate bad behavior that harms consumers, the environment or public health."); John
F. Harris, Class-Bill Near Enactment, WASH. POST., Feb. 11, 2005, at A4 (CAFA will "result in fewer
meritless cases clogging the courts"). Although, interestingly enough, it was a hotly debated statute
garnering lots of attention from public interest and lobbying groups. Even since its passage there
have been surprisingly little attention paid to CAFA. For articles providing an overview of CAFA,
see generally Andreeva, supra note 2; Joseph M. Callow Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005:
Overview and Analysis, FED. LAW., May 2005, at 26; Harris & Busby, supra note 113; Steven M.
Puiszis, Developing Trends with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 115
(2006); Linda Pissott Reig, Charles E. Erway 11, & Brian P. Sharkey, The Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005: Overview, Historical Perspective, and Settlement Requirements, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC.
L.J. 1087 (2005); Roedder, supra note 15; Rollo & Crowson, supra note 109; James Tharin & Brian
Blockovich, Coupons and the Class Action Fairness Act, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1443 (2005); Vairo,
supra note 108; Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1617
(2006). See also Rubenstein, supra note 109.
133. There was little commentary following enactment. In recent years, however, commentators
have begun to notice CAFA. For commentary on CAFA, see generally Carol Rice Andrews, The
Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the National Debate about "Class Action Fairness," 58 SMU L.
REV. 1313 (2005); Burbank supra note 2, at 1447 (concluding that CAFA is "an affront to federalism..
."); John Conyers, Jr., Class Action "Fairness" - A Bad Deal for the States and Consumers, 40 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 493 (2003); Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The "Commencement" Problem: Lessons from a
Statute's First Year, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 469 (2006); Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, In Retrospect: A First
Year Review of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1135 (2006); Samuel
Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action
Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839 (2006); Allan Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act
in a Truly Fair Manner, 80 TuL. L. REV. 1645 (2006); Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann, The Class
Action Fairness Act: An Ill-Conceived Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1695 (2006); Knight,
supra note 129; Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better Way to Handle the
Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521 (2005); Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions
after the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TuL. L. REV. 1593 (2006); S. Amy Spencer, Once More into
the Breach, Dear Friends: The Case for Congressional Revision of the Mass Action Provisions in the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1067 (2006); Emilia L. Sweeney & Rudy A. Englund,
The Class Action Fairness Act's Impact on State Consumer Protection Laws: An Overview of the Act's Effect
on Forum Shopping, 72 DE. COUNS. J. 233 (2005); Laurens Walker, The Consumer Class Action Bill of
Rights: A Policy and Political Mistake, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 849 (2007).
134. Statement on Senate Action on Class-Action Lawsuit Reform Legislation, 41 WEEKLY COM.
PRES. DOC. 227 (Feb. 10, 2005).
135. Id.
136. One commentator discussing CAFA uses headings that illustrate this. Part I is entitled:
"Congress Vents Against the Lawyers;" Part II is entitled: "Congress Vents against the State
Courts;" and Part III is entitled: "Congress Vents Against both the Lawyers and the State Courts."
See Knight, supra note 129. Knight characterizes the story as one in which "a largely incompetent
state judiciary is manipulated like so many faithful puppets by a retinue of unsavory and greedy
shysters who control state actions in state courts without regard for the interests of the class
members involved." Id. at 49.
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device" over the past decade. 137 Specifically, Congress concludes that abuses in
class action lawsuits undermine the judicial system in three ways. First, cases
of national importance are often brought in state court. Second, state courts
demonstrate bias against out-of-state defendants. Finally, state courts impose
their view of the law on other states.138 In addition, Congress concludes that
plaintiffs in class action lawsuits are sometimes harmed where their lawyers
receive large awards and they receive only coupons, where certain class
plaintiffs benefit at the expense of other plaintiffs and where plaintiffs are
unable to understand published notices. 139
As Congress makes clear, CAFA was intended to respond to perceived
abuses in class action practice, specifically to the perceptions that plaintiffs
engage in forum shopping and that too many class action settlements are
approved in which substantial fees are granted to the plaintiff lawyers at the
expense of the plaintiffs. The primary way in which those abuses are addressed
is by expanding federal court jurisdiction of class action lawsuits. 140 This is
137. Congress concludes, without enumerating the abuses, that these abuses have
(A) harmed class members with legitimate claims and defendants that have acted responsibly.
(B) adversely affected interstate commerce; and
(C) undermined public respect for our judicial system.
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(2), 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
138. (a) FINDINGS. - Congress finds the following:
(4) Abuses in class actions undermine the national judicial system, the free flow of interstate
commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the framers of the United States
Constitution, in that State and local courts are -
(A) keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court;
(B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants; and
(C) making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States and bind the rights of the
residents of those States.
Id. at § 2(4).
139. (a) FINDINGS. - Congress finds the following:
(3) Class members often receive little or no benefit from class actions, and are sometimes harmed,
such as where -
(A) counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving class members with coupons or other awards of
little or no value;
(B) unjustified awards are made to certain plaintiffs at the expense of other class members; and
(C) confusing notices are published that prevent class members from being able to fully understand
and effectively exercise their rights.
Id. at § 2 (a)(3).
140. See, e.g., Harris & Busby, supra note 113, at 228 ("The primary goal and main effect of the
Act is to expand federal jurisdiction over class actions, even if those actions involve state law
claims."); Rollo & Crowson, supra note 109, at 12-13 ("CAFA dramatically expands the original
diversity jurisdiction of federal courts over class action cases, and in turn, liberalizes the class action
removal rules. . . . [O]ne of CAFA's fundamental tenets is crystal clear-Congress expressed a
'strong preference that class actions be heard in federal court.'"). Congress's desire to put class
action lawsuits in federal court is presumably based on the belief that federal courts look less
favorably on class action lawsuits and that large numbers of class action lawsuits are a bad thing.
In reaching this conclusion, Congress ignores the benefits and original intents of the class action
lawsuit. Moreover, it ignores the fact that federal courts are overworked as it is. See, e.g., Andreeva,
supra note 2, at 409-410 (CAFA's expansion of federal jurisdiction has "the potential to 'choke
Federal court dockets and delay or foreclose the timely and effective determination' of class
actions"); Burbank, supra note 2, at 1539 ("This aspect of CAFA raises most clearly the question
whether the additional burdens that the statute imposes on the federal courts will adversely affect
the quality of justice, not just in the cases that it allows to be brought to federal court, but also in the
rest of the federal docket"); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Fabrice Vincent & Paulina do Amaral, The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Federalization of U.S. Class Action Litigation, 43 CAN. Bus. L.J. 398, 401
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accomplished in four ways. First, CAFA expands federal jurisdiction by
changing the requirements for diversity jurisdiction for class action lawsuits. 141
Second, CAFA changes the rules with respect to removal to federal court.
Third, CAFA creates narrow exceptions with respect to which actions can
remain in state court. Fourth, CAFA creates a class action bill of rights to
protect plaintiffs from unfair class settlements.
In order to understand how the rhetoric has driven formulation and
enactment of the statute, we need to briefly examine CAFA.
A. Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Response to Forum Shopping
Recall our story. The villains in our story are greedy, unscrupulous and
crafty lawyers. These lawyers will find any court that will certify the class
without thought,142 ideally in a jurisdiction whose juries are famous for
awarding high damages without regard to the merit of the claims.
143
Remember, the story is that state courts are more likely to certify class actions
than federal courts and certain magnet state courts are even more likely to
certify the class. 144 This allows the unscrupulous lawyer to "game" the system.
He shops for the forum most likely to reward the plaintiff class, filing class
actions in state courts whenever possible. Any legal rules that make that
(2006) ("Since CAFA provides for no new judgeships, no additional staffing, and no new resources
for the federal judiciary, CAFA will further increase the federal courts' already heavy burdens.");
Callow, supra note 133, at 30 ("Federal courts, however, are generally overworked and lack the
resources necessary to handle their existing dockets."); Harris & Busby, supra note 113, at 229
("[Q]uestions have been raised about whether federal courts, which are already overcrowded, will
have the time to oversee and manage additional large class actions."); Rollo & Crowson, supra note
109, at 13 (discussing the claims that the federal system is already overworked and noting that
"CAFA would exacerbate this problem by increasing not only the number of cases on the federal
docket, but also the complexity of such cases and the requisite money and attention associated with
each case"). Unfortunately, CAFA provides no additional resources to handle the increase in
caseload. It was estimated that CAFA would force about forty percent of actions filed in state court
into federal court. Linda S. Mullenix & Paul D. Rheingold, Class Actions: Impact of Class Action
Fairness Law, N.Y. LAW J., March 3, 2005, at 5. A Study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center
which examined class action activity during the period from January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2005, found
a substantial increase in class action activity in federal courts following CAFA's enactment.
Specifically, as expected, they found an increase in class actions predicated on diversity of
citizenship and on removal activity. See THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE, THE IMPACT OF THE
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (2006). This increase continued
during the period from January-June 2006. See Thomas E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE, THE IMPACT
OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER
(2007).
141. Interestingly enough, the CAFA jurisdictional provisions do not displace the traditional
diversity class action rules, they supplement them. Professor Rubenstein describes a system of
peaceful co-existence between the old and the new. Rubenstein, supra note 109, at 5 ("CAFA does
not displace conventional diversity class action rules, it augments them.").
142. See generally Rollo & Crowson, supra note 109, at 13 ("CAFA supporters argued that
expanding federal jurisdiction over class actions was necessary to address the perception (and in
some cases, the reality) that plaintiffs' counsel persistently engage in forum shopping by filing class
actions in state courts where huge plaintiff's verdicts are the norm, even though the forum state has
little or no connection to the parties or the transaction at issue.").
143. Upon passage, President Bush stated that CAFA "will keep out-of-state businesses,
workers, and shareholders from being dragged before unfriendly, local juries, or forced into unfair
settlements." Id.
144. For a discussion of magnet state courts that easily certify classes, see S. REP. No. 109-14, at
22-23 (2005).
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difficult are sidestepped.
CAFA's provisions are based on this distrust of plaintiffs' counsel and a
lack of confidence in state and local courts. The Congressional findings accuse
state and local courts of "keeping cases of national importance out of Federal
court," 145 showing bias against out of state defendants 146 and of "impos[ing]
their view of the law on other States and bind[ing] the rights of the residents of
those States.147  Moreover, CAFA's jurisdictional provisions are based on a
belief that class action attorneys purposely choose to file in certain state
jurisdictions that are likely to certify the class and are famous for awarding
large verdicts. Under the law prior to enactment of CAFA, federal diversity
jurisdiction was appropriate only if the amount in controversy was $75,000 and
if there was complete diversity. CAFA significantly expands federal diversity
jurisdiction to force more class actions into federal court.
Under CAFA, federal courts are given jurisdiction over mass actions and
any class action 148 in which there is more than $5 million in controversy as long
as at least one plaintiff class member 149 is diverse from at least one defendant
and over certain mass actions. This expanded jurisdiction is accomplished in
several ways. First, the meaning of diversity is changed under CAFA. Second,
the amount in controversy requirement is changed. Third, CAFA provides for
more liberal removal provisions.
1. Minimal Diversity
In order to qualify for federal jurisdiction under diversity of citizenship,
complete diversity has been a longstanding requirement. In other words, all
named plaintiffs have to be citizens of different states from all named
defendants. 150 Under CAFA, however, the diversity of citizenship requirement
is met if any member of the plaintiffs' class is a citizen of a different state from
any of the defendants (so-called minimal diversity).151 There are, however,
several exceptions to the minimal diversity rule. In an attempt to keep class
actions of a local nature in state court, if the action falls within one of these
exceptions, state court jurisdiction is appropriate. 152
145. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4)(A), 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
146. Id. at, § 2(a)(4)(B).
147. Id. at, § 2(a)(4)(C).
148. CAFA defines a class action as "any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be
brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action." 28 U.S.C. § 1711(2) (Supp. 2008).
149. The term "class member" includes putative class members. 28 U.S.C. § 1711(4) (Supp.
2008). ("[T]he term 'class members' means the persons (named or unnamed) who fall within the
definition of the proposed or certified class in a class action.").
150. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (holding that diversity jurisdiction
does not exist where some of the plaintiffs and some of the defendants are citizens of the same
state).
151. For corporate defendants, the diversity analysis remains unchanged after CAFA. A
corporation is deemed to be a citizen both of the state in which it has its principal place of business
and the state in which it is incorporated.
152. These exceptions are meant to help strike a balance between cases involving legitimate state
court interests and those involving federal interests. See generally Sherman, supra note 134, at 1597
(arguing that the exceptions are too restrictive ("[Tihe two exceptions in CAFA are considerably
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The first of these exceptions focuses on the citizenship of the parties. 153 The
home state exception applies to actions that are filed against defendants in their
home state. Under prior law, if any defendant was a resident of the state where
the action was filed, the case could not properly be brought in federal court.
Under CAFA, whether federal jurisdiction is appropriate for class actions
bought in the state where all the primary defendants 154 reside depends upon
the citizenship of the plaintiff class.
CAFA creates three categories. Which category applies depends upon the
numerical breakdown of the citizenship of the plaintiff class. 155 The first
category covers cases in which two-thirds of the class members 156 and all
primary defendants are citizens of the forum state. In that case, the federal
court must decline jurisdiction. The purpose here is apparently to avoid
"gerrymandering" of the class by the plaintiffs' counsel. 157 Under CAFA, even
if the plaintiffs' counsel chooses a class of plaintiffs who are all from the forum
state, federal jurisdiction is only avoided if all the primary defendants are
citizens of the forum state. The second category covers cases in which less than
one-third of the plaintiff class members are citizens of the state in which the suit
is filed. In that case, federal jurisdiction is appropriate even if the defendant is a
citizen of the forum state. The final category covers cases in which more than
one-third, but less than two-thirds, of the plaintiff class members and all the
primary defendants are citizens of the state in which the suit was filed. In that
case, the federal court may accept or decline jurisdiction "in the interests of
more restrictive than more states-rights-minded proposals, and it seems unlikely that many class
actions can be crafted by class action attorneys to stay in state courts.")). Professor Burbank raises
similar concerns. Burbank, supra note 2, at 1527-1528 ("[Nlone of the exceptions permits a state
court to retain (if the defendant chooses to remove) a class action brought on behalf solely of the
citizens of that state, alleging injuries sustained in the state as a result of the in-state activities of an
out-of-state corporation doing substantial business in the state" (emphasis removed)). The last
three exceptions are unrelated to the rhetoric discussed above. The first of these, the state action
exception, allows cases to be brought in state courts where the primary defendants are states, state
officials or other governmental entities where federal courts relief is unavailable. Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4 (a)(5)(A), 119 Stat. 4 (2005). The limited scope exception
provides that class actions with less than 100 plaintiffs can proceed in state court. Id. at § 4(a)(5)(B).
The last exception, the corporate governance exception, provides that class actions regarding a
covered security, internal corporate affairs, or those that relate to the rights, duties and obligations
pursuant to any security may proceed in state court. Id. at § 4 (a)(9).
153. One question that has been raised concerns the appropriateness of limited discovery to
determine composition of the putative class (necessary to apply the mathematical formulas
discussed infra), which defendants are the primary defendants, which defendants are real local
defendants and where the principal injuries occurred. See generally Roedder, supra note 15.
154. Unfortunately, CAFA fails to define the term "primary defendant." The Senate Report
references the "primary defendants" as the real "targets" of the lawsuits, those who would face the
greatest potential liability, the "deep pocket". See Vance, supra note 133 at 1623.
155. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No 109-2, § 4(a)(3), 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
156. See generally Sherman, supra note 134, at 1598 (discussing the difficulty of determining the
domicile of the each class member as a threshold matter).
157. Roedder, supra note 15. Recall the concern that our crafty lawyer will use artful pleading to
avoid federal jurisdiction. Pre-CAFA, this could be accomplished by choosing one plaintiff from
the same state as one of the defendants. This category is based on a fear that the plaintiffs' lawyer
would choose all plaintiffs from the forum state (say Illinois) and name one Illinois defendant to
defeat federal jurisdiction while the "principal defendant" was an out-of-state defendant. Under




justice and looking at the totality of the circumstances." 158 The Statute provides
six factors that the court should weigh in making this determination. 159
The local controversy exception applies to claims that are unique to the
state where the action is filed. 160 If more than two-thirds of the class plaintiffs
are citizens of the forum state, the court's focus will shift to the defendant and
the conduct alleged. In order for this exception to apply, at least one defendant
"from whom significant relief is sought," and "whose alleged conduct forms a
significant basis for the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class" 161 must
be a citizen of the forum state. The Senate Report terms this type of defendant
as a "real local defendant."162 Then, the attention turns to the conduct alleged.
If the principal injuries163 resulting from the alleged wrongdoing occurred
within the forum state and no other class actions were filed against any of the
defendants asserting the same or similar factual allegations, state court
jurisdiction is appropriate. 164
It is clear how the rhetoric has driven these changes. The continual focus
on lawyers gaming the system is consistent with the story of the opportunistic
lawyer, and reiterates the gaming metaphor. CAFA changes the rule from
158. Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No 109-2, § 4(a)(3), 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
159. The six factors outlined are:
A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or interstate interest;
B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the State in which the action was
originally filed or the laws of other States;
C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction;
D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class members, the
alleged harm, or the defendants;
E) whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed in all
proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than the number of citizens from
any other State, and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed class is dispersed among
a substantial number of States; and
F) whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, 1 or more other class
actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons have been filed.
Id. at § 4(a)(3).
160. Roedder, supra note 15. The Senate Report provides the following example. A class action
is brought in Florida against a Florida funeral home alleging wrongdoing related to burial practices.
Ninety percent of the plaintiffs live in Florida. In addition to the Florida funeral home, plaintiffs
sue an out-of-state parent company. The Senate tells us that this "is precisely the type of case for
which the Local Controversy Exception was developed. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 41 (2005).
161. Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No 109-2, § 4(a), 199 Stat. 4 (2005). The difference
between the defendant contemplated under the home state exception, the so-called "primary
defendant," and the defendant contemplated under this exception, the so-called "significant"
defendant, is unclear. See Vance, supra note 133, at 1624 (discussing definitions of the words
primary and significant to conclude that "a primary defendant' ranks higher in the defendant
hierarchy than a 'significant' defendant). See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 134, at 1600-1601 (discussing
the issues presented by the absence of definitions in this section).
162. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 40 (2005).
163. The term "principal injuries" is not defined. See Puiszis, supra note 133, at 146-147
(discussing potential problems from the ambiguity in the definition).
164. Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2 § 4(a)(4)A)(III), 119 Stat. 4 (2005). This
provision is intended to prevent "copy-cat" lawsuits. See supra note 120 where copy-cat lawsuit are
explained. The problem of copy-cat litigation does not exist in federal court because of the ability to
consolidate proceedings into a multidistrict litigation proceeding in federal court. The CAFA
provisions examining whether similar lawsuits have been filed are intended to prevent a plaintiffs'
attorney from circumventing diversity jurisdiction by using one of these exceptions. See Roedder,
supra note 15.
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complete diversity to minimal diversity. Why? Because under a rule requiring
complete diversity, all the plaintiffs' counsel had to do to avoid federal
jurisdiction was to add one plaintiff or one defendant to the action from the
same state. Voila, federal jurisdiction was lost because complete diversity
didn't exist. The exceptions to the minimal jurisdiction requirement provide
additional evidence of the effectiveness of the causal story. The home state
diversity exception offers a complex mathematical formula designed to prevent
"gerrymandering" by the plaintiffs' counsel. The six factors that the court
should weigh in making the determination about whether the home state
diversity exception exists are consistent with this story.165 For example, the
court should consider whether any copy-cat or duplicative lawsuits have been
filed. Remember, this is a well-known trick of plaintiff's lawyers under our
causal story. The fact that courts are instructed to consider if laws other than
those of the state where the claim is filed are relevant is based on the fear that
magnet courts act "disrespecting or ignoring the laws of other states. 1 66
Moreover, the court should consider whether the class was defined solely to
avoid federal jurisdiction. 167
2. Amount in Controversy
Traditionally, each individual plaintiff was required to meet the amount in
controversy requirement.168  This has also changed under CAFA. Under
CAFA, the amount in controversy requirement is met if the aggregate value of
all the class members claims is greater than $5 million.169
We can again see how the rhetoric supports the legislation. Under the
traditional rule, plaintiffs' counsel could avoid federal diversity jurisdiction
165. See supra notes 154-160 and accompanying text where home state exception is discussed.
166. Roedder, supra note 15.
167. This factor is based on the fear of "gerrymandering" on the part of the plaintiffs' counsel.
See Vance, supra note 132, at 1626 ("If the court concludes that plaintiffs have pleaded an artfully
defined class to avoid federal jurisdiction, this factor would favor the exercise of federal
jurisdiction.").
168. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) ("Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b) class
action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount."). Moreover, the Court made clear in Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1964) that jurisdiction could not be conferred by aggregating claims. Id. at 338
("We have consistently interpreted the jurisdictional statute passed by Congress as not conferring
jurisdiction where the required amount in controversy can be reached only by aggregating separate
and distinct claims."). Zahn was, however, overruled by the court in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005). In Exxon Mobil, the Court held that jurisdiction is
appropriate in a class action where at last one named plaintiff met the amount in controversy
requirement. It did not permit aggregation to meet that amount.
169. It is unclear how the federal courts will aggregate damages to meet this threshold. It seems
likely that courts will include costs such as injunctive relief, punitive damages and attorneys' fees to
satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. See Roedder, supra note 15. Moreover, valuing
injunctive relief can be challenging. Under prior law, courts used one of several approaches to
value a claim for injunctive relief. Some looked at the issue from the point of view of the plaintiff;
some looked at it from the viewpoint of either the plaintiff or defendant; some looked at it from the
viewpoint of the party seeking federal jurisdiction. In the class action context, most courts
measured the benefit to each plaintiff separately to avoid aggregation. Under CAFA, it seems likely
that the approach will be to value claims for injunctive relief by using the total benefit to the
plaintiff class or the total cost to the defendant. See Vance, supra note 133, at 1629 (discussing the
various approaches to valuing injunctive relief for amount in controversy purposes.).
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merely by making sure that no one class plaintiff asked for $75,000. Because
aggregation was not permitted, this would effectively preclude federal
jurisdiction.
3. Removal
In order to fully protect defendants from the perceived abuses in state
courts, CAFA has also liberalized the removal requirements. Under prior law,
defendants were unable to remove an action more than one year after the action
was commenced.170 This prohibition has been removed. This change prevents
plaintiffs' attorneys from gaming the system by amending the complaint more
than one year after its initial filing and either increasing the amount of damages
sought or by dismissing a non-diverse party. In addition, under CAFA, any
such changes to the pleadings would subject the case to removal. 171 Second,
under CAFA, defendants can remove the action to federal court even if one of
the defendants is a resident of the state in which the suit is filed. 172 This section
is included to eliminate the possibility that the plaintiffs' attorneys would
simply include one in-state defendant to evade federal jurisdiction. Moreover,
any one defendant can now remove the action to federal court. This prevents
plaintiffs' counsel from naming a friendly defendant who would block
removal.173
Once more, it is clear that the rhetoric drives the legislation. We change the
removal provisions because plaintiffs' attorneys include out of state defendants
to "evade" federal jurisdiction. 1 74 Under prior law, all defendants had to agree
to removal. We change the removal provisions because of fears that plaintiffs'
counsel would name a friendly defendant, in effect a sham defendant, who
would do the bidding of the plaintiffs' counsel and block removal.
4. Mass Actions
A mass action is what might be termed a "class action in disguise." 175 Mass
170. The law with respect to other diversity cases provides that a "case may not be removed on
the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement
of the action." See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c).
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
173. Under prior law, a defendant had to obtain the consent of all defendants to remove a case to
federal court. See, e.g., Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533-34 n.3 (6th
Cir. 1999) ("[l1n order for a notice of removal to be properly before the court, all defendants who
have been served or otherwise properly joined in the action must either join in the removal, or file a
written consent to the removal."); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1193 n.1 (9th Cir.
1998); Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262 (5th Cir. 1988).
174. The removal standards were intended to "put an end to the type of gaming engaged by
plaintiffs' lawyers to keep cases in state court." Rollo & Crowson, supra note 109, at 16 (citing
Statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner in 151 CONG. REC. H729 (Feb. 17, 2005)).
175. See 151 CONG. REC. H732 (2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (stating that mass actions
"involve an element of people who want their claims adjudicated together, and they often result in
the same abuses as class actions."). Including mass actions within the coverage of CAFA was a
"Congressional attempt to address notorious joinder abuses at the state level." Rollo & Crowson,
supra note 109, at 14.
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actions are civil actions "in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons
are proposed to be tried jointly on the grounds that the plaintiffs' claims
involve common questions of law or fact." 176 Mass actions can be removed to
federal court, but the federal court is only granted jurisdiction over plaintiffs
who have individual claims that meet the $75,000 statutory minimum. 177
Plaintiffs who have claims of less than $75,000 will be remanded to state
court.
178
There are, however, several significant exceptions. First, where the claim
arises out of an event that occurred in the state where the suit is filed and the
resulting injuries occurred in that state or a contiguous state, that claim cannot
be removed to federal court. This exception is intended to apply to
environmental torts. Second, defendants are not permitted to consolidate cases
for trial and then seek to remove the action to federal court. Last, claims that
have been joined or consolidated for pretrial proceedings cannot be removed.
As we have seen, concerns about forum shopping have led to specific
CAFA provisions. Moreover, CAFA addresses concerns about the plaintiffs'
attorney benefitting at the expense of the plaintiff.
B. Bill of Rights: A Response to Unfair Settlements
Section 3 of the CAFA creates what has been termed a "consumer class
action bill of rights." As such, it is designed to protect plaintiffs from unfair
settlements. Most importantly, CAFA provides for heightened scrutiny of
coupon settlements. Recall that coupon settlements are settlements in which
the class members receive coupons instead of direct monetary compensation.
Under CAFA, before a coupon settlement can be approved, the Court must find
that the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate." 179
The most troubling perceived abuse here involves the compensation of
plaintiffs and their attorneys. 180  Hence, CAFA includes guidelines for
calculating attorneys' fees in class action settlements. Attorneys are no longer
allowed to calculate their fee on the basis of the gross amount of the coupons
the class is awarded. CAFA provides that a percentage-based attorney fee must
be calculated on the basis of the coupons actually redeemed by the class
members.181
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). See Spencer, supra note 134, at 1073 (discussing the ambiguity
in the mass tort definition). "Legislative intent shapes nebulous mass action cloud."
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B).
178. Even if the remand results in a class of less than 100, the remaining claims will be
adjudicated in federal court.
179. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e). This does not represent a change from prior law. Kanner, supra note
113, at 1647 ("This does not appear to change existing law on substantive fairness. As a practical
matter, many of the coupon deals that were viewed as most offensive would still be approved
under this standard."). See also Klonoff & Herrmann, supra note 134, at 1697 (concluding that "the
so-called 'problem' of class action settlements is ill-defined, and Congress has passed a series of
unrelated provisions that achieve little and raise more questions than they answer.").
180. Moreover, there are some concerns about a settlement that appears to benefit the
wrongdoer by increasing future sales through the use of the coupon. Rubenstein, supra note 109, at
10.
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a). Contrasting this method with a method of calculating attorneys' fees as
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CAFA also provides for limitations on the settlements that require the
plaintiffs to pay the class counsel a fee that results in a net loss to class
members. Before the court can approve such a settlement, the court must find
that the nonmonetary benefits outweigh the monetary loss. 182 This provision is
designed to address the perceived inequities that occurred in the "infamous"
case of Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp.183 In addition, CAFA prohibits
settlements that provide that class members who are geographically closer to
the court should receive higher payments. 184  This provision prohibits
preferential treatment when there are indistinguishable claims and no
legitimate legal basis for the differentiation. This provision does not prohibit
"incentive awards." These are special awards given to compensate the named
plaintiffs for their effort. 185
Congress also had concerns about class plaintiffs being unable "to fully
understand and effectively exercise their rights." 186 To address this, CAFA
requires defendants to send notification of a proposed class settlement to the
appropriate officials 18 7 no later than 10 days after the proposed settlement.
Final approval of the proposed settlement may not be granted sooner than 90
days after the appropriate officials receive notice. If the notice requirements are
not met, class plaintiffs may "refuse to comply with and may choose not to be
a percentage of the total coupon award illustrates Congressional concern. For example, in the
recent Microsoft anti-trust case in California, Microsoft agreed to provide $1.1 billion of vouchers to
the class plaintiffs. Calculating the attorney fee on the basis of the vouchers available might have
yielded a fee of $220 million (at a 20% fee). Rubenstein, supra note 108, at 11. Under CAFA, the
calculation is made instead on 20% of the value of the coupons actually redeemed. If, for example,
only $100 million is actually redeemed, the fee falls to $22 million. Nothing in CAFA, however,
precludes basing attorney fees upon an hourly basis. Id. In addition, CAFA endorses the continued
use of the lodestar method of calculating percentage-based compensation, with a multiplier when
appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(b)(2). Lodestar compensation entails compensation based on time
spent. Sherman, supra note 134, at 1615.
182. 28 U.S.C. § 1713.
183. Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1996). See supra note 216-
220 and accompanying text (discussion of this case as part of the rhetoric). See Rollo & Crowson,
supra note 108, at 18 (credits the provision concerning net-loss settlements with "the media attention
associated with several 'poster child' examples of notorious settlements."). For a discussion of this
case highlighting the abuse, see Koniak & Cohen, supra note 99, at 1058-1068. Moreover, Koniak &
Cohen argue that this case is representative of class action abuses. See id. at 1081.
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1714.
185. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action
Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1303, 1310 ("[Incentive awards serve multiple
goals. They compensate representative plaintiffs for costs .... They may also, to some extent,
compensate class representatives for what they court perceives to be superior service to the class ...
.11).
186. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(3)(C), 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
Congress fails, however, to specify why that is a concern and it remains unclear exactly what
problem they are trying to solve with the notice requirements. Perhaps Congressional concern has
to do with what has been called the "settlement class action." In these cases, the complaint is filed
virtually simultaneously with the settlement. Such claims offer plaintiffs prompt relief, plaintiffs'
counsel a quick settlement and fee, and defendants a "comprehensive resolution" of the issue.
Burbank, supra note 2, at 1498. The fear, of course, is that plaintiffs and future plaintiffs are
bargaining away their rights without adequate notice.
187. The appropriate official is the official with regulatory or licensing authority over the
defendant. Notice must be sent to the appropriate state official in every state in which the class
plaintiffs reside. The appropriate federal official is typically the U.S. Attorney General. Roedder,
supra note 15, at 447.
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bound by" the proposed settlement. Congressional intent is that this provision
addresses the problem of "clientless litigation." Clientless litigation occurs
where there are many plaintiffs but each has such a small financial stake that no
one closely monitors the case of the settlement process. The official notice
requirement is intended to provide a layer of independent oversight to ensure
that the settlement is fair and equitable. 188
Here, the story changes. We are not concerned so much with crafty
plaintiffs' lawyers working for greedy plaintiffs. Now the plaintiff becomes the
victims. We are reminded of the stories and jokes about the lawyer fleecing his
client; the lawyer benefits and the client is left with nothing but his empty
victory.
IV. PART IV: CONCLUSION
A. The Story as Defined
As we have seen, CAFA was enacted to address the fears of class action
abuses. No doubt, class actions are abused. On the other hand, there is no
doubt that class actions serve legitimate public policy goals. This section will
not consider the extent those fears were justified. What public policy tells us is
that '[v]eracity is not the measuring standard - political success is." 189
Therefore, the primary goal of the this section is to consider the extent to which
formulation of the causal story outlined above lead to CAFA remaining on the
public policy agenda and to its eventual enactment.
Let's reiterate our story. It is a story with villains and victims. CAFA is
premised on a recitation of Congressional findings that are highly consistent
with this causal story. The fact that these findings were, however, based
"primarily on untested anecdotes and assumptions;" 190 that the "reformers had
exaggerated the degree of the abuse," 191 or that the crisis in class actions "may
have more to do with perception than reality" 192 is largely irrelevant. The story
is the story.
188. Id. at 448. It is likely, however, that class action settlements will be more difficult to
conclude because of what have been termed the "onerous" notice requirements. Rollo & Crowson,
supra note 15, at 17.
189. Daniels & Martin, supra note 7, at 73.
190. Willging & Wheatman, supra note 113, at 594. Others argue that the CAFA unjustifiably
attacks "class action lawyers based on the wrong perception that 'lawyers are a ravenous horde
seeking to take advantage of others' real or imagined misfortunes.'" Andreeva, supra note 2, at 386
(quoting Thomas A. Donovan, Proposed Class Action Legislation will not do much to Improve a Lawyer's
Image, 50 SEP FED. LAW. 30, 31 (2003)).
191. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1553, 1556 n.4 (2008).
192. Bloom, supra note 86, at 744-45 ("Perception, however, is no small matter because a widely
held perception that something is wrong can lead to significant changes in public policy, even when
the perception is demonstrably at odds with empirical reality.").
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1. A Distrust of State Courts193
The traditional view of diversity jurisdiction is that it was created to
provide a neutral forum to protect against bias by local courts against out-of-
state litigants.194 The fact that even as far back as pre-1787 no evidence of
actual bias was found, 195 doesn't prevent the legislature and commentators
from relying on perceptions of such a bias.
CAFA's expansion of federal jurisdiction was based on the belief that
federal courts were less amenable to class actions than state courts.196 This
assumption was supported by a Rand Corporation study which found that
federal courts were better venues for class actions because, among other
reasons, federal judges denied certification under circumstances where state
courts might grant it.197 However, a study conducted by the Federal Judicial
Center prior to enactment of CAFA found that there were no differences
between the rates that federal courts certified classes as compared to state
courts. At both levels, fewer than one in four classes filed as class actions were
eventually certified. 198 It appears that post-CAFA, federal courts have
disagreed about how leniently to apply certification standards. 199 Part of the
distrust of state courts is based on a belief that state court judges, who are
typically elected, will rule in favor of local plaintiffs and against out-of-state
defendants in attempt to garner favor with the electorate. There is no evidence
to support this assumption, but the myth lives on.200
2. The Villain: A Distrust of Plaintiffs' Lawyers
Remember in our story, the primary villains are the lawyers; not just any
lawyers, but the plaintiffs' lawyers in particular. They engage in all sorts of
nefarious, manipulative conduct.
First, they are crafty. They engage in forum shopping searching for state
jurisdictions favorable to class action certification. The extent to which this
193. See Knight, supra note 128, at 51 (characterizing the "strident attacks on the competence and
integrity of the state courts that underlie much of CAFA's rationale.... [as] unnecessary and
unseemly in the extreme").
194. Burbank, supra note 2, at 1460 (discussing diversity jurisdiction in a historical context).
195. Id. at 1460-61.
196. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
197. See 151 CONG. REC. S450-01, S451 (2005) (Sen. Grassley's introduction of the bill) (cited in
Harris & Busby, supra note 113, at 228).
198. See Vance, supra note 133, at 1643 (summarizing findings) ("State and federal courts were
'equally unlikely' to certify class actions .... "). See also Callow, supra note 133 (questioning the
validity of the conclusion that federal courts are less likely to certify class actions); Harris & Busby,
supra note 113, at 229 (citing the same study which found federal courts certify 22% of all class
actions, where state courts certify 20%); Willging & Wheatman, supra note 113, at 593 ("[T]here is
little empirical evidence supporting the belief that state and federal courts differ generally in their
treatment of class action.").
199. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 133, at 1609.
200. See Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR
JUDGE 73 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007) ("[E]mpirical research has yet to explore systematically the
relationship, if any, between class certification and the involvement in state judicial elections of
interest groups for whom such rulings might well be a major topic of concern-whether the local
plaintiffs' bar or business-side interests.").
[Vol. 35:2
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
story mirrors reality is challenged by empirical evidence, but the myth lives
on. 201 Moreover, forum shopping is always characterized as bad and
manipulative in our story. The story ignores that fact that forum shopping is a
fundamental fact. Plaintiffs' lawyers choose the jurisdiction in which they file;
defendants' lawyers use whatever tools available to them (e.g., change of
venue, removal) to affect the site of the litigation. It is inevitable and not
necessarily bad. 2
0 2
Although one of the objectives of CAFA was to eliminate forum shopping
in the class action arena, many assume that some degree of forum shopping
will continue. 203 There is an overwhelming fear of "gamesmanship" on the
part of plaintiffs' lawyers 2° 4 to avoid federal diversity jurisdiction.20 5
Commentators fear that plaintiffs will add a state defendant to invoke the state
action exception or invoke the limited scope exception by including only
ninety-nine plaintiffs. 20 6 There is no corresponding fear of gamesmanship on
the part of defendants or their lawyers. For example, although there is mention
of defendants' use of a "divide and conquer strategy" by which defendants
oppose class actions to force multiple plaintiffs to shoulder the burden of
bringing multiple lawsuits, no one characterizes this as "gamesmanship" and
finds it objectionable. 20 7 After CAFA, it is difficult for the plaintiff to shop his
forum, because we can't trust plaintiffs' attorneys, while "the business
community retains the ability to commit the forum shopping abuses that gave
rise to CAFA." 20 8
201. Study Disputes Rising Attorney Fees, Recoveries in Class Action Settlements, 72 U.S. L. WK., Jan.
20, 2004, at 2412.
202. See, e.g., Debra Lynn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 395 (2006) ("Forum
shopping is not a form of 'cheating" by those who refuse to play by the rules. Playing by the rules
includes the ability of plaintiff's counsel to select - and defense counsel to seek to counter - the set
of rules by which the litigation 'game' will be played. The availability of more than one legally-
authorized forum results in legitimate choice, and lawyers ethically are compelled to seek the most
favorable forum to further clients' interests. Selecting the most favorable forum is a rational
strategy... The widespread criticism of forum shopping simply does not withstand scrutiny.");
Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better Way to Handle the Problem of
Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1524 (2005) ("[Elvery lawyer thinks about the best
forum before filing a case or before answering a complaint.").
203. See Vance, supra note 133, at 1642 ("[I]t is safe to predict that the parties will continue to
engage in strategic behavior when it comes to choosing a forum."); Willging & Wheatman, supra
note 113, at 598 (recognizing that even after CAFA attorneys will have choice of forum decisions to
make.).
204. See, e.g., Roedder, supra note 15, at 461 ("This appears to be an attempt to deter the
gamesmanship of plaintiffs' attorneys that was commonplace prior to the CAFA.").
205. See e.g., Harris & Busby, supra note 113, at 230 ("The extent of this increase may be limited,
however, by plaintiffs' attorneys' attempts to structure classes that can remain in state courts.").
206. Roedder, supra note 15, at 458. In addition, there is fear that ambiguity in CAFA will "lead
to creative applications and, perhaps, manipulation." Rollo & Crowson, supra note 108, at 12.
207. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 133, at 1607; EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR. LITIGATION AND
INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY LITIGATION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 181 (1992)
(chronicling the practice of corporate defendants using the federal courts, typically through
removal, to gain advantages over their opponents throughout history). For example, corporate
defendants have the ability to delay and pressure the plaintiffs into favorable settlements because
they have more resources to spend on litigation. Burbank describes corporate defendants as
historically using the "burdens of distance and expense as tactical weapons to wear down
individual plaintiffs." Burbank, supra note 1, at 1467.
208. Kanner, supra note 113, at 1652 ("Another effect will be to give the defendant the right to
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Second, they are greedy. Their compensation is too high. An essential
element in the story is the fact that the settlements entered into are "unfair'
especially to class members and attorneys benefit disproportionately to any
gains by the plaintiffs. The abhorrence of coupon settlements illustrates this
concern. This version of the story, however, ignores the fact that class actions
were in fact designed to encourage lawsuits where compensatory damages for
any one plaintiff would not be large enough to justify a lawsuit.20 9 Moreover,
there is strong empirical evidence that such an argument is unfounded. A
study by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice "contradicts the view that damage
class actions invariable produce little for class members and those class action
attorneys routinely garner the lion's share of settlements." 210 Another study
concluded that the most important factor in determining the attorney's fee is
the amount of the plaintiffs' recovery. In addition, the study found that the
percentage of the recovery earmarked for attorneys' fees was inversely
proportionate to the award. In other words, as the amount of the plaintiffs'
award increased, the percentage of that award that was set aside for attorneys'
fees actually fell. Moreover, this same study found that both plaintiff recoveries
and attorneys' fees had remained relatively stable over the ten year period
examined. 211 In addition, at least one study has found that attorneys' fees are
likely to be higher in federal court than in state court. 212
3. The Victim: The Innocent Defendant
The story also includes an element of unfairness to the hapless defendants.
This part of the story argues that frivolous lawsuits are brought as class actions,
the innocent defendants settle to avoid risking huge judgments by local juries.
Little evidence is offered to support this conclusion. The argument of
frivolousness is typically supported by reference to settlements where plaintiffs
receive miniscule awards and their lawyers receive large fees. Frivolousness is
not, however, measured by the perceived fairness of the award to the plaintiff
or by the size of the attorneys' fees; a suit is frivolous if it is without legal
merit.213 No evidence is offered to support a conclusion that class action
lawsuits are more likely to be frivolous than any other lawsuit.
forum shop. If a 'friendly' plaintiff can be induced to sue a defendant it is hometown, serious
plaintiffs can be removed to federal court while the defendant attempts to get a sweetheart deal in
its hometown court."); Morrison, supra note 203, at 1523 (CAFA proposals are "unabashed efforts at
forum shopping because defendants believe they will improve their chances of success markedly in
class actions if they are in federal courts.").
209. Melnick, supra note 86, at 789 ("The class action provides the mechanism by which the
injured plaintiffs can pool their claims, and in doing so create an action that is worth pursuing.").
210. Andreeva, supra note 2, at 400 (quoting 149 CONG. REC. H5281-03 (2003)). For other studies
on class actions from the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, see Rand Institute for Civil Justice
Website, http://www.rand.org/icj/pubs/class.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
211. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 186, at 78.
212. Id. at 77.
213. Andreeva, supra note 2, at 405.
[Vol. 35:2
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
4. Use of Symbols and Metaphors
There is a class action "crisis." It is all about "fairness." We know that
because the title of the statute tell us it is true. It is fair to try to protect the
hapless defendants from the evil plaintiffs and their attorneys. It is fair to try to
protect the injured plaintiffs from their greedy lawyers. At least once
commentator has argued that CAFA is more about protecting defendants than
it is about protecting plaintiffs or even attempting to achieve a fair balance. 214
The story invokes the metaphor of a game. Plaintiffs' lawyers game the system;
plaintiffs and their lawyers "win the lottery," "strike the jackpot." We are
asked to conclude that the rules of the game are unfair and, therefore, we need
to change them. We need to provide a level playing field.
B. An Alternative Story
The rhetoric of class action by and large ignores the legitimate public policy
goals served by class actions. 215 One justification of class actions is that they
are designed to "correct, punish, and deter big corporations," 216 rather than to
merely compensate the plaintiffs. Using the infamous Bank of Boston case as
an example, no one plaintiff would initiate a lawsuit with the hopes of receiving
an $8.76 award. On the other hand, there are arguably good policy reasons
behind encouraging a lawsuit that punishes the Bank of Boston for improperly
retaining monies in escrow accounts. Such lawsuits use class action plaintiffs
and their attorneys as private attorneys general.217  Termed "regulation
214. See Morrison, supra note 203, at 1548 ("The fact that S. 2062 purports to protect absent class
members, but does not allow them to remove when defendants and class counsel collude to bring
about an unfair settlement, further demonstrates that the bill is not about fairness to class members,
but solely about protecting defendants.").
215. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Risks and Reactions to Underdeterrence in Torts, 70 Mo. L. REV.
691 (2005) ("This piece contends that the traditional (one-on-one) model of tort law may both cause
and exacerbate the underdeterrence problems and, consequently, alternative models (class actions,
augmented awards, and public tort suits) must be considered and analyzed."); Melnick, supra note
85, at 787-797 (discussed the important public policy goals served by class action litigation).
216. Andreeva, supra note 2, at 400. See also Giles, supra note 97, at 430 ("My intuition is... that
many prudent corporate decisions are made precisely because the palpable threat of class action
liability hangs in the boardroom."); Melnick, supra note 86, at 791 ("Therefore, without the class
action device, many businesses would arguably be able to escape answering for their wrong-doings
until they injured someone so substantially that it became cost effective for the injured victim to
pursue the claim individually."); Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 22, at 1087 ("[Ilncreased litigation
is not an evil if it protects important rights, increases overall public safety, at reasonable cost, or
incentivizes the development of safer practices.").
217. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, Jackson, Miss. V. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) ("For better
or worse, the financial incentive that class actions offer to the legal profession is a natural outgrowth
of the increasing reliance on the 'private attorney general' for the vindication of legal rights.");
Melnick, supra note 86, at 791 ("Lawyers who have deputized themselves as private attorney
generals serve a very important purpose within the legal system. Such lawyers represent classes not
only to ensure that the victims are duly compensated, but also to deter certain behavior within
society at large."). For criticism of the "private attorney general" model of class actions, see John H.
Beisner, Matthew Shores & Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action "Cops": Servants or Private
Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1451-62 (2005); David Marcus, Erie, The Class Action Fairness
Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1286
(2006). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer
as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983); Walker, supra note 109, at 863-64
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through litigation 218 or "adversarial legalism," the class action relies on
"litigation to provide compensation for injury and enforce important social
norms."
219
How might we construct a story that supports this alternative view of class
actions? How would the heroes and villains change? If we view class actions
as a legitimate way to further valid public policy objectives, the fact that we
have increasing numbers of class actions filed is now viewed as a good thing.220
It is no longer a problem worthy of public policy attention. We now praise state
courts who certify class actions; we now look for ways to encourage courts to
follow their lead and certify class actions where appropriate.
Who are our heroes in this story? The primary hero becomes the plaintiffs'
attorneys. They ferret out wrongdoing on the part of our evil defendants and
work tirelessly to redress it. This alternative story praises them for their
,entrepreneurial zeal" in finding ways to pursue the class action.221 They are
adequately compensated for their efforts, but neither the plaintiffs nor society
curse them for these rewards. We are happy to pay them for a job well done.
Who are the villains in this alternative story - the defendants who have been
found guilty of wrongdoing. Now, we blame the corporate defendants who
expose their workers to asbestos, or wrongfully retain amounts in escrow
accounts believing that they are immune from action because they have not
stolen enough from any one individual to make them fear a lawsuit.
Who benefits from the class action in this alternative story? We all do. In
this alternative story, class actions support legitimate public policy goals that
benefit society.
So, which is the true story? As the old adage tells us, "Listening to both
sides of a story will convince you that there is more to a story than both
sides." 222
(outlining the private versus public models of enforcement).
218. Hantler, Behrens, & Lorber, supra note 74, at 1153 ("Regulation through litigation takes
place when public prosecutors, private plaintiffs' attorneys, or alliances between these two groups
seek to use mass litigation to impose their beliefs about appropriate business behavior on
businesses that are operating in a lawful industry."). Examples include the actions by state
attorneys general against the tobacco industry to recover state Medicaid costs.
219. Burbank, supra note 2, at 1517. See also Bloom, supra note 85, at 745 ("[I]n earlier days, the
class action device was viewed as an important tool for social justice .. "); Melnick, supra note 86,
at 790 ("These arguments fail to recognize the benefits such litigation provides to the community as
a whole and not simply the benefits it provides to individual plaintiffs.").
220. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA's Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 CARDOZO L.
REv. 2517, 2518-19 (discussing "the notion that litigation itself is a public good."). Burch argues
that class "litigation is both a public good provider-by deterring wrongdoing-and a good itself.
In fact, pursuing class litigation produces a laundry list of positive externalities."
221. See, e.g., Myriam Giles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U.PA. L. REV. 103, 104-05 (2006) ("Class action
plaintiffs' lawyers are indeed independent entrepreneurs driven by the desire to maximize their
gain, even at the expense of class members' compensation. Where the conventional wisdom has
gone wrong, however, is in condemning this as a bad thing and proposing reforms for class action
practice designed to correct this conflict .... All that matters is whether the practice causes the
defendant wrongdoer to internalize the social costs of its actions.").
222. The Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Frank_Tyger/ (last visited
September 7, 2009).
